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Part I.
General Introduction
Limited Liability is a fundamental principle of modern society. Its origins go back
as far as to Ancient Greece where Solon, around 600 BC, abolished debt bondage in
Athens.1 Solon’s reforms came at a time where many small farmers where threatened
by debt bondage due to excessive debt accumulation over the past years. Though
abolished in Athens, debt bondage persisted in many regions in the world and mod-
ern versions of it still do.2 3 Nowadays, sophisticated societies often provide personal
bankruptcy laws to offer some form of debt relief in case of excessive debt accumu-
lation. During a period of time the debtor gives up most of his property and income
in order to try best to repay pending debt. If certain requirements are achieved,
often the final goal for the debtor is a complete relief of the remaining debt after
the proceedings.
But not only on the individual level limited liability is a fundamental principle in
society. The introduction of limited liability into the corporate sector has a long
history. A milestone in this matter was the Limited Liability Act of 1855 which
followed the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 and introduced limited liability for
companies of more than 25 members in the United Kingdom. Regulations for limited
liability were extended in the Companies Act 1862 and the most recent version of
2006 where a key renewal was the abolishment of unlimited liability for directors
of English companies. The European Union has set a general framework 1989 in
their ’Twelfth Council Company Law Directive 89/667/EEC of 21 December 1989
on single-member private limited-liability companies’.
1Croix, G. E. M. D. S., Croix, G. D. S. (1989)
2Kara, S. (2009). Sex trafficking: Inside the business of modern slavery. Columbia University
Press.
3According to the Anti-Slavery Society: ’Pawnage or pawn slavery is a form of servitude akin to
bonded labor under which the debtor provides another human being as security or collateral
for the debt. Until the debt (including interest on it) is paid off, the creditor has the use of the
labor of the pawn.’
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In economic theory, the merits and weaknesses of limited liability in corporation
law have been under severe discussion since the introduction of limited liability in
the nineteenth century and still persist as one of the most debated topics. Limited
liability guarantees investors not to lose more than they invest. There are mainly two
different kinds of capital that is raised in order to run an enterprise, equity and debt.
The main difference from a liability perspective is that in case of a bankruptcy equity
is lost first. The investors are consequently the first to suffer from bad enterprise
performance. In order to limit their loss, limited liability sets a bound to the loss
and shifts part of the risk to creditors. The questions of why it is useful to bound
the risk for equity investors and why one should shift risk from one party to another
arise. If there was a reason for differentiating between equity and debt investment
in order to have debt investment to be less risky as it is lost last, why should debt
investment not be protected even more? There are distinct opinions why it is useful
to shift risk to creditors. While Posner (1976) argues that creditors are less risk
averse than stockholders as well as better informed and therefore better targets for
risk taking, Easterbrook and Fischel (1985) set against that creditors accept lower
rates of return on investment as well as the higher variance of shareholders’ returns.
There are two major reasonings why limited liability is advantageous to unlimited
liability. The first is given by Manne (1967). Manne argues that if investors were
unlimitedly liable for each investment they undertake, investors would concentrate
on few or even a single investment with a large exposure rather than multiple small
investments. The reasoning is quite simple. If an investor was unlimitedly liable,
he could lose all his wealth if only a single of all the projects he invested into fails.
Therefore risk clustering is enhanced by unlimited liability rather than diversifica-
tion. Besides the itself already positive effect of diversification, holders of diversified
portfolios are more likely to realize any projects with positive net present value as
risks can be hedged in the overall portfolio. This is a welfare enhancing behavior and
desired from a social point of view. Halpern (1980) gives a second important reason
for the preservation of limited liability. Limited liability is a necessary tool for the
proper functioning of security markets. If there was no limited liability, the value of
an asset would significantly depend on the wealth of the holder of the share. This
would make the evaluation and thus the trading of shares much more complicated
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and handicap efficient risk allocation on financial markets. This distinct valuation
of asset values according to equity levels is an important feature of Part II. of this
thesis and has important consequences for risk clustering.
While limited liability is sometimes criticized as a benefit the state gives to in-
vestors, indeed many of the large, successful companies are public held limitedly
liable corporations rather than private, owner run companies. There are several ad-
vantages for public held corporations. It is easier to separate the demands of capital,
management knowledge and labor. Workers who lack capital and enterprise knowl-
edge, managers without capital, and investors with lack of special production or
investment skills can join in order to run a project. While the advantage of resource
allocation comes at certain costs such as monitoring of the manager by the investor
and an agency loss, the survival of large public corporations shows an outbalanc-
ing effect of the advantages. Limited liability further reduces some of these costs
as average monitoring costs gets lowered. It might require less intense monitoring
since investors are protected by limited liability. Monitoring, therefore, is only nec-
essary up to a certain point where maximal liability is reached. Especially under the
above mentioned more diversified portfolios of investors under limited liability, the
reduction of necessary monitoring might be substantial. Easterbrook et al.(1985)
mention that not only managers, but also other shareholders would be needed to be
monitored under unlimited liability as their private wealth level directly influences
the enterprise under unlimited liability. This is an important reduction of moni-
toring costs via limited liability. Further they mention the advantages of cheaper
company takeover possibilities on more efficient markets. The efficiency of the mar-
ket itself yields a better information distribution due to more accurate prices (Lorie
and Hamilton (1973)). Therefore, the costs of searching for appropriate investment
opportunities is decreased.
On a more general view one of the most important functions of the financial market
is the one of risk allocation. As discussed, limited liability is a very important tool
for the financial market to be efficient and, hence, be efficient for risk allocation.
Limited liability itself, in a broad sense, is a reallocation of risk as it shifts risk
from equity investors to debt investors. From a welfare perspective and due to risk
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aversion it is often desired that risk is spread between multiple parties within society.
Limited liability serves exactly as a risk distribution tool away from maximal risk
bearing by the equity investor. Therefore limited liability can be seen as a welfare
enhancing risk sharing mechanism.
Having understood that limited liability is a type of redistribution of risk, one
could ask the question whether limited liability is needed at all as it could arise
endogenously on a financial market via the negotiation of insurance contracts. For
instance a debt insurance bought by the company and offered by the creditor might
be close to mirroring limited liability. Third party offers of insurances could even
improve the risk redistribution. Limited liability simplifies this procedure at a first
step without any transaction or bargaining costs.
In between private bankruptcy regulations and corporate limited liability laws, the
lower bound on private welfare losses enhances entrepreneurship and the startup
of new companies. The often risk averse market participants’ concave utility gets
(locally) convexified by the lower guaranteed bound of utility. Therefore, the socially
desired effect of business formations gets enhanced which is seen as a driving force
of the evolution of technology and economic growth.
Besides the individual and the corporate level the third level where limited liability
has to be taken into account is the level of countries. While there is a severe
lack of regulation for sovereign default the list of sovereign debt defaults or debt
restructuring is remarkable. As sovereigns’ balance sheets generally contain much
larger volumes than company balance sheets, consequences of sovereign defaults
might be immense. Economically, nearly every part of the society is involved as
creditors, often private investors and companies, have a haircut on, or completely
lose, principal and interest. Further, a former bankruptcy decreases the access to
liquidity and makes future credits dearer for the government. Due to the impact of
the bankruptcy of a government, a sovereign default is often accompanied by further
crises such as a banking crisis or an economic crisis.
Aside from regulatory limited liability, not only sovereigns but, especially in nowa-
days current financial asset management, also private individuals are able to accu-
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mulate debt volumes that they, de facto, might never be able to even up.
In this thesis I investigate three different economic scenarios where limited liability
plays an impactful role.
In part II., I investigate an investment problem where investors incorporate in
their decision making that they are limitedly liable. While in the literature am-
biguity aversion is an established explanation for limited market participation, I
show that ambiguity might also have positive effects on market participation when
limited liability is anticipated. A key result is that, when incorporating limited
liability, more ambiguity in expected return can lead to less market participation
and risk clustering whereas more ambiguity in volatility might lead to more market
participation and less risk clustering in the same model. An important part of the
mechanics in this model is that the evaluation of assets under limited liability heavily
depends on the liability level of an agent. The idea goes back to Merton (1974) when
valuating debt. The loss in the case of default is represented by a put option with
strike price equal to the maximal liability. Investors that invest in a risky project
might now account for an additional free put option in case of their own default
when evaluating the investment. This is a problematic market characteristic as it
leads to overrating of, especially, risky assets by low equity market participants. The
problem of betting for resurrection is closely related, where financial institutes and
funds increase their risky position when they are close to bankruptcy. Ambiguity
adds an interesting insight on the distribution of risk and market participation when
interacting with limited liability.
Part III. discusses the impact of government-run bailout policies for financial insti-
tutes. The presence of a possible bailout takes liability away from financial institutes
and creates a moral hazard problem with respect to investment decisions and incen-
tive setting for managers. While induced excessive risk taking might harm overall
welfare, coordination improvements due to increased counterparty trust induced by
possible bailouts in case of default can outbalance the negative effects. The pos-
sibilities of risk monitoring play an important role with respect to welfare when
communicating certain bailout expectations. The amount of creditors is crucial as
well as the already expected level of bailout probability when a government thinks
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about increasing their bailout efforts.
Part IV. investigates the problem of a fund manager managing a portfolio on
order of an investor. The investor incentivizes the fund manager via benchmarks
and bonus payments based on portfolio success. The only observable variable for
the investor is the portfolio performance. The principal agent problem for delegated
portfolio management is special because the agent has two choice variables that the
principal cannot observe, the choice of effort and the choice of portfolio structure.
The agent can exert more or less effort in order to acquire information that is
important for the investment decision and therefore have access to better investment
opportunities or lower the variance of a portfolio. After doing so, the agent structures
the portfolio in order to maximize his utility. Since increasing the bonus payment
probability can often be achieved by both, exerting more effort but also by taking
more risk, the agent might shirk and simply choose a riskier portfolio. Therefore,
while bonus contracts are useful to incentivize an appropriate effort by the manager,
they might also result in excessive risk taking in order to reach benchmarks, while
the manager is not liable for the taken risks in case of default. In order to limit risk
taking, besides the bonus and the benchmark, an appropriate risk measure has to be
chosen and an according risk level has to be satisfied. I show that in a model where
the market allows the manager to replicate measurable payoff structures the size of
the bonus is not the key cause for more risk taking. The setting of the benchmark
rather decides the probability of a portfolio default, whereas an excessive bonus
would not change the portfolio structure compared to an optimal bonus setting.
The following three parts II-IV are written in a self-contained manner and can be
read independently.
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Part II.
On Different Effects of Ambiguity
towards Market Participation under
Limited Liability
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1 INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction
Limited participation is a well observed phenomenon in stock markets. While the
classic portfolio theory expects a much higher share of the population investing in
risky assets, empirical studies show that the majority of households do not hold any
stock. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) report that the holding of stock is increasing in
the household’s liquid assets, but even for households with liquid assets of $100.000
less than half of them own stock. Campbell (2006) reports similar findings.
Explanations for this have been tried to be found in many directions. Participation
costs, as in Paiello (2007) or entry costs as in Allen and Gale (1994) or Yaron and
Zhang (2000), have not been found to be fully explaining this phenomenon, as well
as risk aversion, heterogeneous beliefs or minimum investment requirements.
Considering risk aversion as a possible explanation, it is a natural question to
ask whether ambiguity aversion might explain the observed behavior. In economic
theory, risk and (Knightian) uncertainty are two distinct driving features of agents’
and firms’ observed behavior. The difference of risk and ambiguity can be described
as follows. When an investor faces an asset with multiple possible payoffs and given
probabilities for these different outcomes, one generally refers to a risky asset. In
contrast, when facing uncertainty, the investor is not even sure about the underlying
probability distribution. Practically, it is not always clear whether a situation is risky
or ambiguous and it has to be seen more as a fluent passage from the one case to the
other. While for a (fair) coin toss there is nearly no doubt that the probabilities are
known, the probability for a country going bankrupt or an atomic reactor to explode
might be highly in question. In between, problems like car insurance provide a large
amount of data and give a very good idea about the underlying probabilities, but
still leave some ambiguity.
Knight (1921) first theoretically distinguished uncertainty and risk in the behavior
of decision making. While he originally differentiated between uncertainty that is
measurable and uncertainty that is not measurable (in terms of probability), Ellsberg
(1961), in his famous urn experiment, shows that decision makers violate the inde-
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pendence axiom of classical expected utility theory by Savage (1954). Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) give axiomatic requirements (including an axiom that captures
uncertainty aversion) for preferences that induce a utility representation known as
the maxmin expected utility. This representation features a set of probability mea-
sures, rather than a single one, for the decision maker and is a widely used approach
to introduce ambiguity into economic models. Since then, several representations
of preferences have been found that explain how a decision maker behaves when
ambiguity is part of a decision problem.
I will give a short overview over the most important papers that take a step back
from subjective expected utility and go towards ambiguity. In the stream of litera-
ture with incomplete preferences, Bewley (1986) gives a representation that indicates
that agents prefer an alternative x to y only if the expected utility is better under
all probability measures of a set of priors. Having a model with endowments as a
status quo, agents will only change their status quo if they will be better off under
all priors. Several famous representations can be found when assuming that pref-
erences are complete. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) give a representation called
Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU). They drop the classical independence axiom and
add uncertainty aversion as well as constant independence. Their representation
shows that agents evaluate alternatives as expected utility under several probability
measures from a set of priors but only consider the worst case. The Choquet Ex-
pected Utility, Schmeidler (1989), which uses capacities rather than probabilities, is
closely related as long as the capacity is convex. Maccheroni, Marinacci, Rustichini
(2006) introduce Variational Preferences, a representation where, again, alternatives
are evaluated under multiple priors, but each evaluation incorporates a cost function
depending on the prior. In this sense, unlikely priors might be devalued compared
to more likely ones. Overall, again, the worst case is considered by the agents. This
specific representation breaks down to the MEU case in case of a cost function which
is constantly zero. Another famous cost function, the relative entropy, yields the
Multiplier Preference model of Hansen and Sargent (2001). The relative entropy is
a measure for the distance of probability measures and punishes unlikely scenarios
for being far away compared to a ’most likely’ benchmark scenario. Finally, the
relative Gini concentration as a distance of probability measures as cost function,
12
1 INTRODUCTION
breaks down the Variational Preferences to Mean-Variance Preferences. Klibanoff,
Marinacci, Mukerji (2005) introduce Smooth Ambiguity Preferences. They can be
seen as a second order belief representation with a probability distribution over the
probability measures in the set of priors.
The first explanation that finds ambiguity aversion as a cause for nonparticipation
in financial markets is given by Dow and Werlang (1992). Dow and Werlang show
that, under ambiguity aversion, evaluating a long position and a short position of
a risky asset is done under different probability measures. Therefore, they find
a range of prices where an investor is neither interested in holding positive nor
negative positions of risky assets. Cao, Wang and Zhang (2005) show that with
heterogeneous agents, differing in their perceived ambiguity about the mean return,
a higher ambiguity dispersion leads to a smaller fraction of agents participating in
the financial market. Easley and O’Hara (2009) consider professional traders that
know the exact prior and private investors that perceive ambiguity in the form of
a set of priors. They show that high perceived ambiguity about the mean return
might make the private investors not participate in the market, while they do not
find any influence of ambiguity with respect to volatility.
The incorporation of limited liability into portfolio theory has a long history. Mer-
ton (1974) already treats the equity of a company as a call option on its assets when
pricing debt. More recently Gollier (1997) investigates optimal portfolio choices with
utility functions that are bounded from below. In this spirit Ross (2004) generally
investigates whether convex transformations ’convexify’ concave utility functions;
i.e. make a decision maker more risk loving. Wilson (2010) points out problems the
’free’ put option creates when running bailout or ’bad bank’ programs like TARP
and PPIP. The free put option accounts for limited liability in case of default. The
evaluation of the price of risky, or even more, highly toxic assets, is different for
agents with different liability. Institutions close to bankruptcy might evaluate these
assets at a higher price than institutions with sufficient equity. This naturally leads
to risk clustering at institutions that are already struggling. Governmental programs
in order to buy toxic assets at market price to relax banks’ balance sheets or even
subsidized programs buying these assets at prices that are above the market price
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might at first address banks that are well equipped in terms of equity. In this way
subsidies directly go to the profits of high equity banks and leave ’stressed’ banks
unaffected. Only excessive high subsidies and thus, excessive overpricing will address
stressed banks. Very closely related to this behavior is the well known phenomenon
of ’betting for resurrection’. Troubled institutes increase the amount of risky posi-
tions when they are close to bankruptcy, because this maximizes the probability of
getting back into a profitable state while there is no difference of going bankrupt or
’even more bankrupt’.
In my model, I will show that ambiguity in expected return and in the variance
of the risky asset has different effects in terms of market participation when agents
differ in their equity and explicitly take into consideration that they are limitedly
liable. For ambiguity in the mean payoff I find similar results as Cao, Wang and
Zhang and Easley and O’Hara. The more ambiguity is in the market, it might
happen that some agents do not hold any risky assets anymore. In contrast to their
papers, I find an effect of volatility uncertainty that is opposing the effect of return
uncertainty. The explanation behind this is as follows: A limitedly liable agent
holds a free put option in his portfolio that accounts for the possible default case
when limited liability comes into play. This option differs in value depending on the
equity of the agent, hence, the risky asset might have different values for different
agents. The value of this put option heavily depends on the volatility of the risky
asset. Increasing ambiguity in the volatility decreases the value of the put option
and makes the evaluation of the risky asset in between the different agents more
even. Therefore, more agents might be participating in the market. The focus of
my analysis is the case where there is one bank with high equity and one bank with
low equity in order to point out the most striking results representing a market with
’healthy’ and ’stressed’ banks.
The paper is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I give the setup for the model
and derive the optimal behavior for the agents. Chapter 3 takes a look at the
equilibria of this model and the impact of ambiguity. In Chapter 4, I discuss the
model with respect to risk punishment, heterogeneous perception of ambiguity and
governmental policies. Chapter 5 concludes.
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2. The Model
2.1. Modeling Ambiguity
Ambiguity in this model follows the Maxmin Expected Utility representation of
Gilboa and Schmeidler. The utility representation for a random variable X can be
written in the following way:
min
Q∈P
∫
Eu(X)dQ
The decision maker evaluates the expected utility under all probability measures
given by a set P and then takes the worst case into account. While this behavior
has a nice interpretation in terms of a decision maker identifying all possible sce-
narios with the set P and then being very pessimistic about the outcome, this is
not necessarily the case. The axioms of Gilboa and Schmeidler only provide the
existence of such a set and the observed behavior of agents from the outside looks
as if they behave accordingly pessimistic. Whether agents only consider priors in P
cannot clearly be stated as well as the set P being the remainder after removing all
scenarios that can be excluded. Some more insight in the underlying behavior and
the interpretation of a set P and the consideration of the worst case might be found
in Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008).
2.2. General Setup
I consider a two stage model with t ∈ {0, 1} and two risk neutral agents i = 1, 2.
The agents can choose to buy a desired amount θi of risky assets at price P with
exogenous supply x in t = 0. In t = 1 the return of the risky asset X is realized.
The distribution of the return is ambiguous and characterized in the following way.
Let
(ω1, ω2, ω3) ∈ Ω = {h, l} × R× R
15
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and let P1 be given by
P1(w1 = h) = P1(w1 = l) =
1
2
.
Further, I define
P1 = {P1}
P2 = {λ ∈M1(R)|λ((−∞, µ)) = 0 ∧ λ((µ,∞, )) = 0}
P3 = {λ ∈M1(R)|λ((−∞, σ)) = 0 ∧ λ((σ,∞, )) = 0}4
and
P = {Q = P1 ⊗ P2 ⊗ P3|P2 ∈ P2 ∧ P3 ∈ P3}.
The perceived payoff of the risky asset is then given by
X(ω = (h, µ, σ)) = µ+ σ
and
X(ω = (l, µ, σ)) = µ− σ.
I assume that the distributions are independent and thus, ambiguity in return and
volatility do not depend on each other as well as on the state of the economy given
by Ω1 = {h, l}. This assumption of separability into two distinct dimensions of
ambiguity enables us to get specific results for each type and point out the difference
between these two dimensions. I assume
σ > µ > 0.
This will later guarantee a positive expected return and a negative payoff in the
case of the low state of the economy. The agents are certain about the probabilities
whether the economy is in a high or low state. The payoff in the particular cases,
however, is subject to uncertainty as the payoff distributions in the two states cannot
be completely specified and only be reduced to the cases contained in P2 and P3.
4M1(R) denotes the set of all probability measures on R and I assume 0 < µ < µ as well as
0 < σ < σ.
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The variables µ and σ serve as proxies for return and volatility, respectively. The
agents have endowment in terms of illiquid equity which equivalently will be the
maximal amount an agent is liable with. I denote the equity of the agents by
L1 > 0 and L2 > 0, respectively. Further, there is an infinite supply of liquidity
at a constant interest rate r in order to finance the investment. For simplicity
I assume r = 0. The infinite supply of liquidity is a common feature of many
financial models and an important property for markets to be efficient. The constant
interest rate is often a simplification that comes along with the assumption of infinite
supply, which is highly in question. In addition, the agents face a cost function c(θi)
depending on the amount of risky assets in their portfolio. This cost function might
capture the fact that liquidity, especially as demands become extremely large, is
not available at constant costs. Moreover, possible punishments for risk taking
might be included in this function. For the further analysis I continue with the
simple case of c(θi) = γθ
2
iP
2. This case resembles increasing unit punishment for
increasing required liquidity. I will later show that qualitatively similar results can
be obtained in case of a risk management that punishes risk taking according to the
entropic risk measure. In order to focus on the most important results I only allow
nonnegative amounts of risky assets θ1, θ2 ≥ 0. The agents aim at maximizing their
t = 1 portfolio value.
2.3. Optimal Demand
The period 1 portfolio value for agent i is given by
max(0, θi(x− P ) + Li − γθ2iP 2).
The objective for agent i is thus
max
θi≥0
min
Q∈P
E(max(0, θi(x− P ) + Li − γθ2iP 2)).
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The optimization is not completely straightforward as the boundedness from below
by 0 leaves this problem nonconcave. The portfolio defaults if
x <
γθ2iP
2 − Li
θi
+ P.
2.3.1. Identifying the Worst Case
In classic portfolio theory agents prefer high returns and try to avoid volatility. A
crucial assumption that is the driving factor in most cases for preferring low volatil-
ity is risk aversion. While risk aversion is modeled via a concave utility function,
incorporating limited liability does not leave agents with concave objectives any
longer. Ross (2004) discusses whether convex incentive schemes convexify concave
utility functionals. This is a closely related problem as call-type incentive schemes
as f(x) = max(−Li, x) are strongly related to our portfolio problem. Gollier (1997)
analyzes the impact of imposing a lower bound on the utility function in order to
incorporate limited liability into portfolio choice. A striking result is that, even in
the case of risk aversion, high volatility might be preferred.
Coming back to the agents problem, we can easily identify the case P2(µ = µ) = 1
as the worst case for every possible portfolio choice of the agent. As we only allowed
long positions, a low µ yields the lowest expected returns in every case. The worst
case with respect to volatility can be identified as P3(σ = σ) = 1. At first the
agents are risk neutral putting them at a volatility neutral attitude in the case of
full liability. If agents are not able to fully bear possible losses, increased volatility5
increases expected returns as only the positive state ω1 = h is affected from their
point of view. Hence, P3(σ = σ) = 1 can be identified as the worst case, at least in
a weak sense. The decision makers in this model, through the distortion of limited
liability, can thus be viewed as weakly volatility loving.
5in the sense of a mean preserving spread
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2.3.2. Worst Case Optimization
Having identified the probability measures that yield the pair (µ, σ) as the worst
case, we can rewrite the objective as:
max
θi≥0
max(θi(µ− P )− c(θiP ) + Li, 1/2(θi(µ+ σ − P )− c(θiP ) + Li), 0)
The expectation is still bounded from below by 0. Moreover, in this decomposition
we can see how the limited liability takes effect on the optimal behavior. Either the
agent is able to bear all losses and he is in the first case of the maximum function,
or the agent is only interested in the high state as he is not able to bear the losses in
the low state given his choice θi and the second argument of the maximum function
is dominating. This decomposition further shows that the objective might have two
local maxima.
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Θ
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
A typical expected utility curve depending
on the amount of risky asset for high equity;
the left optimum dominates
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Θ
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
The same situation with decreased equity; an
agent would demand a higher amount of
risky asset
In the graphic a typical curve for the expected utility depending on the amount
of risky asset is shown. Starting at 0 risky assets every additional unit yields its
expected return at the cost of the price and the risk/liquidity punishment. After
costs get too high, utility is decreasing. When the amount of risky assets becomes
sufficiently large, limited liability is a driving factor. Any additional unit now only
affects the terminal portfolio value in the high state. This might yield an increasing
utility, again, until the costs dominate. I will denote the right local maximum as
the limitedly liable optimum (lim) and the left optimum as the fully liable optimum
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(full). The height of the maxima heavily depend on volatility and equity. It might
very well be that the lim optimum is below the corresponding value of the fully
liable parabola. The maximizers might even be negative, which is a priori excluded.
In order to choose optimally, the agents have to compare whether they are better
off with a safe choice or with the risk of running default compared with the third
alternative of holding a risky position of zero units. I collect the decision rules in
the function φ, which is defined in the following theorem. As a result we can state:
Theorem 2.1. The optimal demand is given by
θ∗i (Li, P, µ, σ) =
µ−P
2γP 2
if µ > P and Li > φ1(P )
0 if µ+ σ ≤ P or (Li > φ2(P ) and µ ≤ P ≤ µ+ σ)
µ+σ−P
2γP 2
else
where
φ1(P ) =
(µ+ σ − P )2 − 2(µ− P )2
4γP 2
and
φ2(P ) =
(µ+ σ − P )2
4γP 2
.
Defining φ(P ) := φ1(P ) if µ > Pφ2(P ) if µ ≤ P
the optimal demand can be rewritten as
θ∗i (P ) =
max
(
0,
µ−P
2γP 2
)
if φ(P )− Li < 0
max
(
0,
µ+σ−P
2γP 2
)
if φ(P )− Li ≥ 0
Proof. Maximizing the two quadratic functions separately yields
θi
∗
full =
µ− P
2γP 2
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for the fully liable case and
θi
∗
lim =
µ+ σ − P
2γP 2
for the limitedly liable case. The first result is that for P ≥ µ + σ the optimal
demand is 0. For P ≤ µ the fully liable optimum is always better than demanding 0
units of the risky asset. Plugging in the two maximizers and comparing the maxima
yields that the fully liable choice yields higher expected returns if and only if
Li ≥
(µ+ σ − P )2
4γP 2
− (µ− P )
2
2γP 2
.
Hence, in this case the limitedly liable optimum is the global optimum if Li ≤ φ1(P ).
The last case is the case of µ ≤ P ≤ µ+ σ. In this case at most the limitedly liable
optimum might be the global one. The necessary condition to yield higher expected
returns than holding 0 risky assets is then given by Li < φ2(P )
An overview about the optimal choices can be found in the following table:
P ≤ µ µ ≤ P ≤ µ+ σ µ+ σ ≤ P
Li < φ1(P ) lim lim 0
φ1(P ) < Li < φ2(P ) full lim 0
φ2(P ) < Li full 0 0
The last column is 0 as the price is higher than an asset’s expected marginal
return, even in the case of limited liability. For low prices, we find that the limitedly
liable optimum yields higher returns if the equity is sufficiently low. The medium
column has a similar interpretation. At most the limitedly liable optimum can yield
a better payoff than nonparticipation since P ≥ µ. This is only the case if equity is
low enough.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8
P
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
The two local optimizers θi
∗
full (blue) and
θi
∗
lim (red) depending on the price
2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
P
0.5
1.0
1.5
The two sufficient conditions for optimality
φ1(P ) (yellow) and φ2(P ) (orange)
The left picture above shows θi
∗
full (blue) and θi
∗
lim (red) depending on the price.
The right picture shows φ1(P ) (yellow) and φ2(P ) (orange). The curve φ2 always lies
above φ1 and they have a common tangential point at P = µ. The overall relevant
decision rule φ is given by φ1 until the tangential point and by φ2 afterwards. If
equity is below φ, the ’lim’ case is the relevant optimal amount, else the ’full’ case
is the optimal amount. In the following picture the optimal demands depending on
the price are plotted together with the conditions φ(P ) (green) that compare which
optimizer yields higher expected return (φ1) and whether the ’lim’ optimizer yields
higher expected return than holding 0 risky assets (φ2):
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
P
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
θ∗full, θ
∗
lim with φ for
µ = 3, σ = 4, γ = 1, L = 1.5
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
P
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
θ∗full, θ
∗
lim with φ for
µ = 3, σ = 4, γ = 1, L = 0.2
In both pictures above, the red curve is the optimal demand until φ (green) and
equity (purple) cross. Afterwards the fully liable optimizer (blue) gives the optimal
demand. Overall demand is bounded by 0. These conditions yield a discontinuous
demand curve. The according demand curves for the risky asset depending on the
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price P are given in the following graphics:
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
P
1
2
3
4
5
6
Demand curve for
µ = 3, σ = 4, γ = 1, L = 1.5
2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
P
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Demand curve for
µ = 3, σ = 4, γ = 1, L = 0.2
We see that the demand is decreasing but also discontinuous with respect to the
price. This is due to the risk/liquidity punishment and the optimizer jumping from
the ’lim’ case to the ’full’ case when increasing the price. Under certain market
conditions, especially if equity is low, the optimal demand might directly jump to
zero from the ’lim’ case when prices increase. If the equity is low, it crosses φ at a
very high price. If this price is above µ, the demand directly goes to zero. If the
equity is high, the crossing will occur at a price where the ’full’ case still yields a
strictly positive optimizer. The aggregate demand with two agents might, thus, even
have two jumps. For an exogenous supply of risky assets it is not always possible to
clear the market. In the equilibrium analysis I will further investigate the impact of
equity and ambiguity on market clearing.
3. Equilibrium Analysis
Many different equilibrium outcomes might arise with respect to which agent par-
ticipates and whether they demand an amount where they can fully cover losses or
not, depending on the parameters of the model. While the most striking results are
fairly general even in this setup, I will, nonetheless, start with a full characterization
of all possible equilibrium outcomes in order to describe the model completely.
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3.1. A full Characterization
I define an equilibrium as a pair of optimal demand θ∗ and a price P ∗ such that the
market clearing condition
θ∗1(L1, P
∗) + θ∗2(L2, P
∗) = x
is satisfied. Several equilibria might occur in this setup. A single agent might clear
the market with an amount that puts him at a possible loss exposure he cannot
fully cover. I will denote this equilibrium with the subscript l. For market clearing
via an agent who can fully cover possible losses I use the subscript f . For the cases
where both agents demand positive amounts, I use the subscripts ll, ff and lf to
distinguish whether these agents demand volumes such that both cannot fully cover
losses, both are able to fully cover losses or the combined case where only one of the
agents can bear all losses. Having the market clearing condition, one can calculate
the equilibrium prices for the cases. The equilibrium prices for the respective cases
are:
• Pl = − 14γx¯ +
√
1
16γ2x¯2
+
µ+σ
2γx¯
• Pf = − 14γx¯ +
√
1
16γ2x¯2
+
µ
2γx¯
• Pfl = − 12γx¯ +
√
1
4γ2x¯2
+
µ+σ/2
γx¯
• Pff = − 12γx¯ +
√
1
4γ2x¯2
+
µ
γx¯
• Pll = − 12γx¯ +
√
1
4γ2x¯2
+
µ+σ
γx¯
I denote the respective equilibria with E and the according subscript. In order to
identify which equilibrium will occur, I start with the following result:
Proposition 3.1. Ef is impossible.
Proof. As we can see in the table for a participant to demand a positive amount of
risky asset that leaves him fully liable we must have P ≤ µ. Also in the table we
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can see that for this price any participant would demand a strictly positive amount
of the risky asset. Hence, Ef is not possible.
We proceed with the following result.
Proposition 3.2. A necessary condition for El is µ
2 ≤ σ
2γx¯
and a necessary condi-
tion for Efl is µ
2 ≥ σ
2γx¯
.
Proof. In El it is necessary to have Pl ≥ µ. If this was not the case, the second agent
would demand a strictly positive amount. In a similar fashion in Efl we must have
Pfl ≤ µ. These requirements yield the above conditions and show that with respect
to the parameters these two types of equilibria are mutually exclusive.6
In the following I will give a full characterization of the equilibria that arise de-
pending on the given parameters. Afterwards, I will discuss the results with a focus
on the case where one agent has high equity and the other agent has low equity. This
represents the case where a fraction of banks in the market is stressed while others
fulfill high equity requirements. Without loss of generality I will assume L1 ≤ L2
for the rest of the paper.
Theorem 3.1. • Case 1: Let µ2 < σ
2γx¯
- If L1, L2 ≤ φ2(Pll) then the unique market equilibrium is of type Ell
- If L1 ≤ φ2(Pl) ≤ L2 then the unique market equilibrium is of type El
- If L1, L2 ≥ φ1(Pff ) then the unique market equilibrium is of type Eff
- It is 0 < φ2(Pll) < φ2(Pl) < φ1(Pff )
• Case 2: Let σ
2γx¯
< µ2 < σ
γx¯
- If L1, L2 ≤ φ2(Pll) then the unique market equilibrium is of type Ell
6except for the case µ2 = σ2γx¯
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- If L1 ≤ φ1(Pfl) ≤ L2 then the unique market equilibrium is of type Efl
- If L1, L2 ≥ φ1(Pff ) then the unique market equilibrium is of type Eff
- It is 0 < φ2(Pll) < φ1(Pfl) < φ1(Pff )
• Case 3: Let µ2 > σ
γx¯
- If L1, L2 ≤ φ1(Pll) then the unique market equilibrium is of type Ell
- If L1 ≤ φ1(Pfl) ≤ L2 then the unique market equilibrium is of type Efl
- If L1, L2 ≥ φ1(Pff ) then the unique market equilibrium is of type Eff
- It is φ1(Pll) < φ1(Pfl) < φ1(Pff )
In addition, it is
φ1(Pfl) = φ2(Pl)
for µ2 = σ
2γx¯
and
φ1(Pll) = φ2(Pll)
for µ2 = σ
γx¯
.
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Types of equilibria depending on the equity
of the two agents for µ2 ≤ σ2γx¯ .
Types of equilibria depending on the equity
of the two agents for σ2γx¯ ≥ µ2 ≥ σ2γx¯ .
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Although the full characterization shows that the kind of equilibrium that will arise
heavily depends on the parameters of the model, general results can be pointed out.
If both agents have fairly high equity at their disposal, the unique equilibrium is of
type E3. This means that if banks fulfill high equity requirements, in equilibrium
they will demand amounts of risky assets so that they are able to bear any possible
losses attached to the demanded position. On the other hand, if both banks have
equity that is close to 0, the equilibrium outcome is one where both banks cannot
fully cover losses in case of a bad state outcome. The most interesting case is the
one where one bank has fairly high equity while the other bank’s equity is close to
zero. In this case it depends on the amount of perceived ambiguity whether both
banks will hold risky stock or whether only one bank will hold all available amounts
of the risky asset.
Corollary 3.1. ∃a, b ∈ R such that for L1 ≤ a and L2 ≥ b a unique equilibrium
exists. The low equity agent participates with certainty, not being able to cover all
losses.
The participation of the high equity agent is subject to ambiguity and is discussed
in the comparative statics section.
The results that φ1(Pfl) = φ2(Pl) for µ
2 = σ
2γx¯
and φ1(Pll) = φ2(Pll) for µ
2 = σ
γx¯
show the smoothness of the borders of the equilibrium areas when going from case
1 to 2 and from case 2 to 3. The blank areas show equity combinations for which no
equilibrium exists. We can state the following corollary for a policy that demands
high equity requirements.
Corollary 3.2. ∃a ∈ R such that for L1, L2 ≥ a a unique equilibrium exists and the
unique equilibrium guarantees that agents can cover losses completely.
I will conclude the equilibrium analysis with comparative statics to show how
ambiguity influences market participation.
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3.2. Comparative Statics
When I talk about an increase of ambiguity in expected returns or volatility, I
understand a symmetric increase of the sets
P2 = {λ ∈M1(R)|λ((−∞, µ)) = 0 ∧ λ((µ,∞, )) = 0}
and
P3 = {λ ∈M1(R)|λ((−∞, σ)) = 0 ∧ λ((σ,∞, )) = 0}.
More ambiguity in µ means an increase of µ as well as a decrease of µ. The same
holds for σ when I talk about volatility. Let us start with a situation of a stressed
bank and a bank that is well equipped in terms of equity. Let µ2 > σ
2γx¯
. We
then observe an equilibrium of type Efl. Both banks holds positive amounts of
risky assets. If there now was a sufficient increase in ambiguity about µ, such that
µ2 < σ
2γx¯
, equilibrium El would be observed and only the stressed bank would
hold all the amount of risky stock available. We can clearly identify that more
ambiguity in the mean return might make agents in the market not participate.7
Moreover, this kind of ambiguity might lead to the clustering of risks at already
stressed institutions. The result of an increase in ambiguity about returns leading
to less participation can also be found in Easley and O’Hara as well as Cao, Wang
and Zhang. On the other hand, in this model the opposite happens when ambiguity
about the volatility is increased. Assume L1 is sufficiently low and L2 is sufficiently
high. Again it is easy to see from our equilibrium analysis that, if we are in El, a
sufficient increase in volatility ambiguity leads to equilibrium Efl. This means that
more perceived volatility ambiguity gets back well equipped banks into the market
for risky or even toxic assets.
Proposition 3.3. ∃L1, L2 such that the following holds: Let parameters be given
such that the unique equilibrium is of type El. A sufficient increase in volatility
uncertainty yields a unique equilibrium of type Efl.
7It might be necessary to increase the ambiguity in volatility simultaneously to stay within the
model setup. Still the result holds that an increase in return uncertainty might make agents,
who participated before, not participate.
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Proof. Let σ1 and σ2 be such that µ
2 < σ1
2γx¯
and µ2 > σ2
2γx¯
. Then ∃L11, L21 such that a
unique equilibrium of type El exists and ∃L12, L22 such that the unique equilibrium
is of type Efl. Choosing L1 = min(L11, L12) and L2 = max(L21, L22) guarantees
the result for σ moving from σ1 to σ2.
What has to be pointed out is that the perceived ambiguity is the same for all
market participants in this model. While in Easley and O’Hara only one of the two
types of agents was affected by a variation of ambiguity and, hence, directly made
the evaluations of the risky asset even more distinct, in my model both types of
agents are affected in the same way by a change of ambiguity. Only the effect of
their distinct levels of equity leads to different evaluations. In the case of volatility
uncertainty this, then, leads to the complete opposite reaction; i.e. making evalua-
tions of the risky position more even among the heterogeneous types of agents.
Remark 3.1. In equilibrium Efl we have the local results
δθ∗2
δσ
< 0,
δθ∗1
δσ
> 0.
This remarks shows that not only a sufficient increase in volatility ambiguity leads
to the entrance of the high equity bank into the market, but also that a further
increase leads to a distribution of risky assets away from the stressed bank to the
high equity bank.
Remark 3.2. In equilibrium we have the local results:
∂P ∗
∂µ
> 0
∂P ∗
∂σ
≥ 0
The intuition is that a decrease of the worst case volatility decreases the value
of the free put option and therefore the valuation for the low equity agent while
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there is no influence on the valuation for the high equity agent. Therefore, in the
aggregate, evaluations decrease and, thus, the equilibrium price decreases. For the
worst case return it is even more clear. A decrease decreases the valuation of both
agents and therefore the price. Thus, for little variations in ambiguity that do not
change the type of equilibrium an increase in ambiguity in either dimension has the
same effect.
An increase of prices due to an increase in ambiguity is a well discussed phe-
nomenon as the existence of an ambiguity premium in addition to the well known
risk premium is assumed to be a driving factor of stock prices (see Ui (2010) or Cao,
Wang and Zhang (2005)).
4. Discussion
4.1. Entropic Risk Punishment
The driving feature for the results of chapter 3 are the shape and the behavior
of the demand function. Having two local maxima and guaranteeing that the right
maximum dominates for low equity and the left maximum dominates for high equity
is the key for my results. I will show in the following that with the entropic risk
measure as a cost function I can obtain a similar demand function.
4.1.1. The Entropic Risk Measure
The entropic risk measure for a bounded random variable X on a probability space
(Ω, F, P ) is given by
ρ(X) =
1
β
log(EP (e
−βX))
with β > 0. It is a widely discussed risk measure as it satisfied the most reasonable
requirements on a risk measure such as monotonicity, cash-invariance and (quasi-
)convexity. The relaxation of fulfilling convexity rather than positive homogeneity
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compared to coherent risk measures allows non-trivial solutions in the this model.
4.1.2. Demand Function
Assume now that risk is measured in terms of the entropic risk measure and punished
by a cost factor c. The objective for agent i is thus
max
θi≥0
min
Q∈P
E[max(0, θi(X − P ) + Li − c
β
log(EP (e
−βX)))].
The risk punishment is convex and its limit unit punishment for an additional unit
of risky asset is given by −c(µ − σ). Hence, for large c this problem is non-trivial
and due to the convexity of the entropic risk measure we have a similar behavior as
before: The expected return of an additional unit of risky asset net its price has a
positive jump when losses cannot fully be covered anymore. The risk punishment is
concave and increasing for large demands. This leads to the possible occurrence of
two local maxima that depend on the equity of the agent. Below, the objectives are
plotted for high and low equity with entropic risk punishment for µ = 3;P = 1;σ =
10; β = 0.2; c = 7:
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Θ
0.5
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Equity L = 1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Θ
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Equity L = 0.1
The use of risk punishment via other appropriate risk measures in this model is
also possible without severely distorting the results. The most important demands
on a risk measure to be appropriate for risk controlling with respect to this model
is its convexity. If it is strictly convex, the risk measure alone might leave this
setup non-trivial. For the more restricted class of coherent risk measures, positive
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homogeneity is no drawback to the quality of results as long as other assumptions
keep the problem finite.
4.2. Risk Measures as Cost Function
The incorporation of a risk measure as a cost function is without any doubt a feature
that is quickly at hand when modeling portfolio decisions. Banks are obliged to
fulfill high standards of risk monitoring and the outcome gives feedback on solvency
capital or equity requirements. As equity is costly from the perspective of a financial
institute, risk directly causes costs. A key feature of the above model is that agents
differ in their equity. When evaluating the cost for risk or liquidity, equity is not
taken into account. Especially high equity might be a reason for reducing risks or
getting better conditions on liquidity demands. The evaluation of the portfolio is,
thus, made in a way of narrow framing. Still, the idea of the approach holds true as
equity in this model might be identified with ’soft’ values like reputation and brand
value. These are not to be taken into account for the portfolio problem as these
values only exist as long as the portfolio does not default. Moreover, these values
are only taken into account by the operator of the business for internal analyses
rather than by a regulatory framework. In this sense the use of risk measures as
a cost function without the incorporation of the heterogeneity in ’equity’ is still
meaningful.
4.3. Heterogeneous Beliefs
The formation of the set of priors depends on many factors. As described before,
the interpretation of this set is not trivial. Nonetheless, the amount of available
information and what an individual can read out of it might influence the set of
priors significantly. As not all people have the same access to information or the
same ability to draw conclusions out of given information, it is very likely that the
set of priors may be different for different individuals. I will briefly discuss how
different beliefs might affect the results of this model.
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4.3.1. Heterogeneity in Expected Return
In this section I investigate which equilibria will occur if the perceived ambiguity
between agents varies. Therefore, I start with dispersion in the mean return keeping
the volatility fixed; i.e. let µ
2
> µ
1
and σ2 = σ1 = σ. Agent 2 perceives less
ambiguity than agent 1. Keeping the average amount of ambiguity fixed, talking
about more ambiguity dispersion means increasing µ
2
and decreasing µ
1
by the same
amount. The following necessary conditions for the possibility of equilibria hold:
Proposition 4.1. Necessary conditions for the different types of equilibria are given
by:
• Ef : µ2 ≥ µ1 + 2γx¯µ21
• El: µ2 ≥ µ1 + 2γx¯µ21 − σ
• Ell: µ2 ≤ µ1 + 2γx¯(µ1 + σ)2
• Eff : µ2 ≤ µ1 + 2γx¯µ21
• Efl: µ2 ≤ µ1 + 2γx¯µ21 − σ
Corollary 4.1. High ambiguity dispersion with respect to the mean return is a cause
for nonparticipation.
Proof. The proof of this proposition as well as sufficient conditions are given in the
appendix.
The result has to be read in the following way: The more disperse the perceived
ambiguity is, only equilibria with single agents participating are possible to occur.
This result shows that, with respect to the mean return, uneven information or
knowledge distribution within society might be a factor that causes agents not to
hold any risky assets and, thus, cause risk clustering. I will investigate the impacts
of volatility uncertainty dispersion in the following chapter.
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4.3.2. Heterogeneity in Perceived Volatility
Assume now that µ
2
= µ
1
= µ but the perceived volatility levels may be distinct.
Perceived volatility does not influence the equilibrium prices for the types of equi-
libria where no agent is gambling on going bankrupt. Therefore, with undispersed
expected return ambiguity, Ef is not possible for the same reasons as in chapter 3.
Eff is possible with the same price as in chapter 3, only the necessary conditions
for the minimum amount of required equity have to be fulfilled separately according
to the individual perceived volatility level. Ell is possible if equity is low enough for
both agents and the price corresponds to the price of chapter 3 with the average
worst case ambiguity level.
The most interesting cases, once again, are the equilibria El and Efl. In chapter
3 El was possible with agent 1 holding all the risky assets as I assumed L1 ≤ L2.
Keep the average amount of ambiguity fixed and recall that necessary conditions
were given by the relation of µ2 and σ
2γx¯
. The transition from El to Efl was possible
for an increase in volatility ambiguity if equity was disperse enough. Denote the
average worst case volatility with σ =
σ1+σ1
2
.
If µ2 > σ
2γx¯
, Efl is possible and El is not. For the case of no dispersion, sufficient
conditions are given in chapter 3. If dispersion arises, the equilibrium price for this
type of equilibrium is not affected. Only the necessary and sufficient conditions with
respect to equity might change. A change to an equilibrium with a single participant
is not possible.
If µ2 < σ
2γx¯
, El is possible and Efl is not. Again, for the case of no dispersion,
sufficient conditions can be found in chapter 3 and the low equity agent holds all the
risky assets. If dispersion arises, the equilibrium price is affected via the perceived
volatility of the agent that holds all the risky assets. The main difference in this
case is that both, the high and the low equity agent, might be the single participant
in the market, depending on both, the different levels of perceived ambiguity and
the different levels of equity. If the low equity agent perceives less ambiguity, he can
be the only one to hold all the risky assets with sufficient equity conditions. The
reasoning is that due to both, the lower ambiguity as well as the lower equity, the
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low equity agent will always evaluate the asset higher than the high equity agent.
If the low equity agent perceives more volatility ambiguity, the high equity agent
might as well be the single participant. The equilibrium, nonetheless, stays unique.
Assume that parameters were that equilibria with both agents were possible. For
agent 2 it must then hold that
L2 > φ2(σ2, Pl(σ1))
if agent 1 holds all the risky assets as well as
L2 < φ2(σ2, Pl(σ2))
if agent 2 holds all the risky assets. Since φ2 is decreasing in P these conditions
cannot hold at the same time and the equilibrium must be unique. Still, the high
equity agent might be the one holding all the risky assets in the case of σ1 < σ2 if σ2
is sufficiently large. Therefore, more dispersion might change the market participant
in this case. A numerical example is given in the following: Let x = 1; γ = 1;µ =
1;L1 = 1;L2 = 4. Let the dispersion be given by σ1 = 6 − δ and σ2 = 6 + δ. One
can show that for δ = 0.5 agent 1 will hold all the risky assets, while for δ = 4 agent
2 will hold all the risky assets. Hence, with this new phenomenon of a shift of the
market participant due to more ambiguity it is possible to distribute risky assets
away from the low equity agent to the high equity agent. This phenomenon only
occurs if perceived ambiguity dispersion is high and the high equity agent perceives
significantly less ambiguity than the low equity agent.
4.4. Policy Implications
The general consensus of many theoretical findings is that a reduction of ambiguity
leads to better performances of the market. Easley and O’Hara point out that
nonparticipation caused by ambiguity imposes costs on the economy via the effect
on the equity premium. More general, all nonparticipation results necessarily lead to
a clustering of risks at the remaining market participants. This, especially in times
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with stressed markets and many troubled institutes, is not desired from a welfare
perspective. Governmental interventions during the last financial crisis showed that,
especially in times where several banks are low on equity, one of the main focuses
is freeing the balance sheets of low equity banks from risky or toxic assets. While
many models already pointed out the benefits of reducing mean uncertainty in order
to achieve a better risk distribution among institutes, this cannot be transferred to
reducing volatility uncertainty. Reducing ambiguity can generally be achieved via
higher reporting standards. Higher standards lead to better information and reduce
the set of priors, especially when this set of priors arises from robust statistics. But
pure information on its own is not the the only major influence on perceived sets of
priors. Especially for naive investors a better knowledge of how to use information
in order to make the right investment decision is a substantial part for transferring
the increased information to a reduction of the set of priors. Hence, educating
investors on financial markets is a key feature to reduce the set of priors. From our
findings, we can see that increasing the information about expected future returns
should be the focus of reporting standards. Supplying more information and, thus,
reducing ambiguity in this dimension leads to a better distribution of risk within
the society. On the other hand, we have seen that volatility uncertainty in markets
might be desirable from a risk distribution perspective, especially when there are
banks with low equity. The liability point of view is new to nonparticipation models
and shows that ambiguity in markets might have a positive effect. Hence, when
there are many troubled banks, reducing uncertainty in this dimension might not be
the target of governmental policy. Especially when running programs as TARP or
PPIP, sufficient volatility uncertainty might be crucial for these programs to achieve
the desired effect. Higher uncertainty in volatility leads to less overpricing of toxic
assets by stressed banks, which makes it easier for subsidized governmental or private
partnership asset buying programs to relief toxic assets from stressed banks’ balance
sheets. But not only effectiveness might be achieved as higher efficiency makes
these programs much cheaper through the reduced overpricing. When running these
programs, governments clearly define (toxic) assets that are eligible for subsidized
buying. In this sense one can identify for which assets the above mentioned reporting
standard policies are useful.
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Having seen that more dispersion of perceived ambiguity between the agents might
also be a cause for nonparticipation, governmental policies should aim at an even
information distribution as well as at an even knowledge standard with respect to
financial markets, in order to establish a similar perceived ambiguity between all
possible market participants. This is a key feature to make more agents participate
and points at the importance of an even information distribution and its use, which
is in any case desirable, rather than the sheer amount of available information. Re-
garding volatility uncertainty it is not as important to achieve a uniform information
distribution but to provide sufficient information to high equity institutes.
5. Conclusion
Most models that combine ambiguity and nonparticipation find that more ambigu-
ity leads to less participation. In this model I have shown that ambiguity in mean
return and volatility can have different effects on market participation. While more
ambiguity in the mean return might lead to less participation, which is a result of
many former models, more ambiguity about the volatility might lead to more agents
participating in the market, which is a new result. Moreover, more volatility uncer-
tainty leads to a better distribution of risk between the agents. The most important
driving feature is the incorporation of limited liability. Heterogeneous agents, dif-
fering in their equity, evaluate risky assets differently. More volatility uncertainty
makes these different evaluations more even. Therefore, overpricing via the free put
option gets less and more agents might participate in the market. The jumps in the
optimal demand depending on the price might cause a nonexistence of equilibrium
as the aggregate demand is discontinuous. More volatility uncertainty reduces the
range where there is no equilibrium. While uncertainty is often considered to be
harmful to markets and welfare, I have shown that some ambiguity in markets might
have a positive effect and therefore, ambiguity might even be desirable. For recent
governmental interventions ambiguity facilitates the effectiveness and might even
make required governmental subsidies much cheaper. As not all agents necessarily
perceive the same amount of ambiguity, I investigate that a more diverse perception
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of ambiguity might also be a cause for nonparticipation. This is in line with the
findings of Cao, Wang and Zhang and recommends an even information distribution
among society.
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Bonuses, Bailouts and Creditor
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1. Introduction
The discourse about the appropriate size and structure of manager bonuses is one of
the most discussed topics in the delegated portfolio choice literature. While in many
cases it is without any doubt useful to incentivize a manager to exert more effort in
order to achieve a better performance, many observers called the continued bonus
payout in times where a lot of banks were struggling into question. This criticism
got enhanced when troubled institutes had to be saved by governments and became
the subject of a bailout policy. In the view of many the government subsidies were
directly redistributed to the managers bonus payments. But not only the managers
were seen as the profiteers of governmental intervention as the banks themselves
benefited by several taken measures.
The delegated portfolio choice problem is a special kind in the field of principal-
agent problems. While in the most simple principal-agent setting an agent has
private information about his effort choice and the principal can base his payment
only on an observed outcome, in the delegated portfolio choice problem there is a
second dimension of asymmetric information. The agent privately chooses his effort
first as well as the structure of the portfolio afterwards while the principal is still
only able to observe the outcome of the portfolio. Although a high incentive in most
cases might induce the agent to exert more effort which is desired by the principal,
a too big sized bonus might be harmful to the portfolio structure choice.
Given that most working contracts contain a payment structure that is bounded
from below and moreover the simple fact that every agent is effectively limitedly
liable, it is obvious that not only a mean preserving spread, but, from a classic
portfolio perspective even worse, a mean decreasing and variance increasing trans-
formation of the portfolio might be desired by the agent and induced by high bonus
payments.
In current literature the incorporation of these two private choices of the agent is
often approached in the following way. The effort choice is a choice in two dimen-
sions, risk and return, and perfectly separable.
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Knowing about the two dimensions of asymmetric information in this internal
agency problem between the principal and the agent, it is worthwhile noticing that,
as many banks raise money from creditors, there also exists an external agency
problem as creditors might observe and anticipate the payment contracts offered
by the principal. If creditors observe an incentive scheme that induces a higher
default probability, they will charge a higher interest rate on their loans in order to
compensate the increased default probability.
Anticipating a bailout strategy by the government, the creditors might demand a
lower interest rate on their loans supporting a default increasing incentive setting.
While the negative effects of a bailout strategy due to moral hazard are quick off
the mark, there are well known reasons for doing so. The first reason is the one
of a domino effect. Financial institutes are highly interconnected to not only other
financial institutes but also nearly every company in the economy. A bankruptcy
of an institute, especially if it is a large one, might be followed up by several more
bankruptcies of connected companies. The second reason can broadly be defined
as confidence. While there are several works on how important confidence in the
financial system is in order for it to work optimally and sustain crises, a special
characteristic of the lack of confidence can be seen in the problem of coordination
failure between creditors. Coordination failure might cause premature foreclosure
of credits or denial of refinancing. Often creditors have invested in a project that
is on the verge of failing and a necessary condition for the project success is that
sufficient credits are prolonged. For the creditors this decision is not obvious. If
enough creditors stay in the project, it is best to stay because it is likely to get back
the full loan and interest. If many creditors leave the project, it is better to leave
early with a reduced return because the project is likely to fail eventually.
I present a simple model that incorporates the internal principal agent problem,
the external problem with creditors, a bailout strategy by the government and the
problem of creditor coordination. My findings show first that bonus contracts arise
endogenously in the principal agent framework. There is an important difference
whether a bank faces a classical effort problem or a risk shifting problem. While both
problems lead to a bonus contract, the size of the bonus may be either too high or too
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low from a social perspective, depending on the type of the problem. A high bailout
probability of the bank will push the bonus size and the managerial effort further
away from the desired state. The reasoning behind this is that a bailout strategy
primarily influences the creditors in case of default. The creditors therefore might
charge lower returns on their loans. While in both problems a shift of probability
mass away from the default state becomes less attractive the two problems differ
in their incentive strategy. In the classical case higher incentives shift probability
away from the default state, while in the risk shifting problem incentives increase
this probability. Given this, a cap on manager bonuses, as it is a recent topic in
theoretical analysis and political discussion, may thus only be appropriate if it is
used in the right context or if there are additional measures that can enforce such
a context. The question of financing a bailout strategy comes at hand. While for
modeling purposes it is often assumed that a bailout is financed externally or by
an indirect tax, one might at least identify the benefit recipients of such a policy in
order to address a possible taxation strategy. However, findings show that a bailout
strategy might be overall harmful to the net value of the whole problem and there
are no profiteers. The multiplicity of creditors plays an important role in delegated
portfolio problems if there is a coordination problem. I show that multiplicity of
creditors might push the size of the bonus in the opposite direction as a bailout
strategy for both types of effort problems. Further, I show that for low bailout
probabilities, there is no effect of changing the bailout probability if there is a single
creditor, while there is a coordination effect in the multiple creditor case. For high
bailout probabilities the effects coincide independent of the number of creditors.
There is vast literature in the field of delegated portfolio management. Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1987) analyze the optimal structure of manager compensation. They
find that a linear contract might be the optimal contract. However, many findings
show that linear contracts are not optimal since an underinvestment in effort can be
observed in many models. A famous example is the work of Admati and Pfleiderer
(1997) who show that an agent cannot be incentivized to the benefit of the principal.
While Starks (1987) argues that symmetric contracts are desirable, it is often difficult
to implement appropriate punishment for bad outcomes into working contracts.
Most payment contracts are bounded from below and two types of contracts are
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predominant. The simple bonus contract that pays a bonus if a benchmark is reached
and the call type compensation contract that pays a fixed amount and a share of the
profits if profits exceed a certain benchmark. Even if the principal claims big losses
from the agent according to the compensation contract, current volumes and risks
of portfolios can quickly lead to a loss the agent is not able to bear. Ross (2004) and
Gollier (1997) analyze the distortion of risk taking by a convex compensation scheme
and find that there are multiple effects. Ross shows that a convex compensation
scheme not necessarily increases the risk taking as scale effects might also effect the
expected utility, while Gollier shows that mean variance inefficient portfolios in the
classical sense might be selected. John and John (1993) show that a compensation
scheme might be able to reestablish the first best level of risk taking.
Empirically, there are different results on risk taking behavior. While Houston and
James (1995) find no excessive risk taking incentives in the financial sector compared
to other sectors, Cheng, Hong and Scheinkman (2010) report a significant connec-
tion. Besley and Ghatak (2013) analyze an optimal bonus contract and optimal
taxation if the manager is able to influence the risk and the variance of a portfolio.
The importance of creditors is barely analyzed in the literature of delegated portfolio
choice. Recently, Hakenes and Schnabel (2014) incorporate creditors into the agency
problem and analyze the effect of bailouts. The main feature is that creditors are
able to observe the bonus contract and anticipate it via the demand for the interest
rate on their loans, hence, becoming an active part of the agency problem. They
find that the possibilities of influencing return and risk lead to different results in
the agency problem.
Creditors often face the problem of coordination when engaged in an investment.
Coordination and the selection of equilibria is an important field of game theory
and has a close link to the value of debt and default. While in a coordination game
there are classically multiple equilibria, the selection of the right one is a big field of
research. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) introduce risk dominance in order to justify
the selection of a certain equilibrium. When it is observed that in the same prob-
lem different equilibria are chosen with a certain frequency, a stream of literature
models this with so called ’sunspots’. The assumption is that an extrinsic, non fun-
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damental variable influences expectations and thus, the selection of an equilibrium.
Cass and Shell (1983) introduce sunspots into economic theory and Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) use this approach in order to justify equilibrium selection in a co-
ordination problem in financial markets. A more endogenous approach of multiple
possible equilibrium selection in coordination games is opened up by the field of
global games. Using higher order beliefs and incomplete information the selection
of a single equilibrium based on the outcome of an endogenous random variable can
be justified. The seminal work is by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and a general
approach can be found in Morris and Shin (2001). Applications to financial markets
are widespread. Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) model the equilibrium selection in
the case of a bank run. The advantage of the global game approach is that the
driving random variable for the equilibrium selection is a feasible one and thus equi-
librium selection probabilities can be specified. Morris and Shin (2004) employ a
global games framework on the problem of creditor coordination in order to price
debt.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I describe the driving forces of
the model. I give the setup and timing of the problem between principal(bank),
agent(manager) and creditors. A closer look has to be taken at the difference of the
cases of a single creditor and multiple creditors. Chapters 3 and 4 specify the man-
agerial effort and discuss the classical effort problem and the risk shifting problem,
respectively. The main interest of my analysis are effects on bonus sizes, expected
utility, default probabilities and welfare. In section 5, I discuss the closely related
paper of Hakenes and Schnabel, the appearance of both types of effort problems and
alternative effort modeling. Section 6 concludes.
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2. The Model
2.1. The Model Setup
Consider a three stage model with t = 0, 1, 2. A bank is endowed with equity k
and has to collect a loan L from creditors in t = 0 in order to run a desired risky
investment that yields some payoff in t = 2. The interest rate for this loan is
contractible and specified later. In t = 1 the creditors have the possibility to review
their investment given the state of both, the project and the economy. The loan
can either be provided until t = 2 or the creditors have the possibility to withdraw
a collateral K instead.8 The investment can only be operated by the manager and
the success of the project is subject to the effort the manager exerts. I assume
that both the bank and the manager are limitedly liable; i.e. the bank is only
liable with respect to its equity while the manager cannot be punished for losses
by employing a negative wage. All decision makers in this model are assumed to
be risk neutral. The states of the world in t = 1 are given by Ω = Ω1 × Ω2 where
Ω1 = {h,m, l} and Ω2 = R. Ω1 denotes the possible states for the project in t = 1
and Ω2 are the possible states of the overall economy. The states regarding the
project can take four values in t = 1 according to the states h,m, l: Yh, Ym, (Yl, 0)
with Yh > Ym > Yl > 0 while the state of the economy in t = 1 is described
by θ with continuous distribution function F and support on R. I assume that
project performance and overall economic performance can be separated perfectly
and, hence, the state of the project is independent from the state of the economy.
In the high state the project will be successful and yield Yh in t = 2. In the medium
state the project will be successful and yield Ym in t = 2. For the low state it is not
certain whether the project will yield Yl or fail and yield 0. In l the success of the
project depends on two things; the state of the overall economy θ ∈ R and whether
the creditors are willing to stay in the project. If the state of the economy is below
0, the project will fail for sure, while if the state of the economy is higher than z > 0,
the investment is a sure success. For values in (0, z) the project success depends on
8I generally refer to K as the value of the collateral in t = 2
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the provision of liquidity by the creditors. Let R1 denote the contractible interest
rate for the loan given the state is high or medium and R2 the exogenously given
interest rate in case of a success in the low state. The payoff for the creditors is the
following: In the states h and m they receive R1 while in state l they receive R2 if
the project is successful and they stay, 0 if they stay and the project fails.9 If they
quit, they receive K in any case. The outside option for creditors is given by the
market interest rate r > 0.
Investment
l
0
θ < z(1− l)
Yl
θ ≥ z(1
− l)
p
l
m Ym
pm
h Yh
ph
The decision rule in the low state is explained in chapter 2.3.
9Keeping R2 exogenous simplifies the problem and prevents excessive interest rate agreements.
Further R2 is assumed to be sufficiently small in order to guarantee a positive R1
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2.2. The Timing of the Model
• In t = 0 the bank offers a contract to the manager
• The creditors observe the offer and the bank repays an exogenously given
amount R2 if the project is in the low state and successful, creditors demand
rate R1 for the states h and m
• The bank collects money L from creditors and invests
• The manager chooses effort10
• In t = 1 the state of the project and the economy is revealed, the agent receives
payment based on the state of the project, the creditors decide whether to
foreclose the loan or to stay in the project
• In t = 2 project success is revealed and loans plus interest are paid back if
possible
2.3. The Coordination Game
In t = 1 the creditors have to decide whether to stay in the project or to foreclose
the loan and receive some collateral K where I assume that R2 > K > 0. While
the project success depends on the one hand on the state θ, it also depends on the
amount of liquidity that is provided in t = 1. The decision for a creditor in the single
creditor case depends only on θ. In the multiple creditor case the project success
and thus the creditors’s payoffs also depend on the decision of the other creditors.
We assume that the amount of required liquidity depends in a negative way on the
state of the economy; The better the state of the economy is, the less liquidity is
required. In both cases, if θ is below 0 the project will fail with certainty, while if the
state of the economy is higher than z the investment is a sure success. In between
the amount of provided liquidity is of importance and the project will be successful
10The outside option for the manager is set to 0, hence, he always chooses to participate in the
project
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if z(1− l) < θ where 1− l denotes the share of loans that are not prolonged and z is
a parameter that indicates in how far the project is sensitive to credit prolongation
and its volume. In the global games literature this parameter is often interpreted as
’the severity of disruption caused by the inability to coordinate’.
2.3.1. The Single Creditor Case
If the loan is provided by a single creditor the optimal behavior of the creditor is
determined as follows. If the signal is greater 0 the creditor will prolong the loan
since this guarantees project success and R2 > K. If θ ≤ 0 the project will fail with
certainty and he chooses to foreclose his loan and take K as K > 0. Thus, in the
single creditor case the low state outcome is a random variable that takes the values
0 and Yl with probability F (0) and 1− F (0), respectively.
2.3.2. The Multiple Creditor Setup
In the multiple creditor case the payoff of each creditor depends on θ and the deci-
sions of all players. I assume a continuum of creditors [0, 1] and the project success
is given as before. Let u(x, l, θ) denote the payoff for a creditor depending on his
action x ∈ {0, 1}, where 1 means that the loan is rolled over, while 0 means that
the creditor quits the project. The share of creditors that roll over the loan is given
by l ∈ [0, 1] and the state of the economy is given by θ. The payoff for the creditors
is then:
• u(1, l, θ)=
R2 if z(1− l) ≤ θ0 if z(1− l) > θ,
• u(0, l, θ) = K
Given this payoff structure a creditor wants to stay in the project if the fraction of
creditors that stay is high enough and quit if the fraction is too low. This is a well
known phenomenon when dealing with multiplicity of creditors. The coordination
game has two pure strategy equilibria and the selection of one of these equilibria
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has a vast literature. Assume now that the creditors observe a noisy signal of θ;
yi = θ + εi. The εi are i.i.d. and normally distributed with mean 0 and standard
deviation σ. This is a coordination game with incomplete information and is part
of the literature of global games.
2.3.3. Global Games
The literature of global games was started 1993 by Carlsson and van Damme. They
showed that in a 2 player coordination game a small amount of noise in privately
observing an economic fundamental leads to a unique strategy selection. Morris
and Shin (2001) adopted to this. Similarly to the previously described coordination
problem two investors evaluate whether to invest or not invest while receiving a noisy
signal with normally distributed noise. The decisive underlying fundamental θ in
their case has an improper uniform distribution on the real line. As only conditional
distributions are relevant for the analysis of this problem there is no drawback in
this assumption (see Hartigan 1983). Specifically, the payoff to both investors is θ
if both invest. If an investor does not invest he gets 0 irrespectively of what the
other investor does. If an investor invests, but the other does not, his payoff is θ−1.
In this sense, the optimal behavior would be clear if there was no noise and θ was
not in [0, 1]. If θ was greater 1, investing would be optimal, if θ was smaller 0 not
investing would be the choice. In between two pure Nash equilibria exist, but the
selection is not clear. Assume now that the standard deviation of the independent
noise terms εi is σ. When player i observes xi = θ + εi the updated belief about
the distribution of the other player’s observation is a normal distribution with a
mean of x and standard deviation
√
2σ. Morris and Shin then analyze switching
strategies at some threshold k; i.e. if a player’s signal xi > k he will invest, else he
will not. Assume now player 1 observes x1 and believes that his opponent switches
at k. His expectation for θ will be x1 and the expected probability for player 2
observing a signal less than k is Φ
(
k−x√
2σ
)
.11 For the case that x1 = k he assumes his
counterpart to be investing or not investing equally likely. Let us now take a look
at the switching strategy at 1
2
for both players. It is easy to see that this strategy
11Φ denotes the standard normal distribution function
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is an equilibrium. If player 1 receives signal x1 his expected payoff is
x1 − Φ
( 1
2
− x1√
2σ
)
.
The structure of this payoff is increasing in x1 and breaking 0 exactly if x1 =
1
2
.
Therefore, investing is optimal exactly if x1 ≥ 12 . In fact Morris and Shin show that
switching at 1
2
is the only strategy surviving iterated deletion of strictly dominated
strategies. Assume player 2 switches at k. Define the best response of a switching
point for player 1 with b(k) as the unique solution for x given the equation:
x− Φ
(
k − x√
(2)σ
)
= 0.
b(k) is strictly increasing and takes values between 0 and 1 with b(0) > 0 and
b(1) < 1. Moreover, there is exactly one fixpoint k = 1
2
. Define now the strategy
s(x)=
invest if x > bn−1(1)not invest if x < bn−1(0)
for n rounds of iterated deletion of dominated strategies. For n = 1 and if player
2 never invests it is optimal for player 1 to invest if x1 ≥ 1 and, conversely, we get
that not invest is optimal if x1 < 0. Proceeding by induction and simultaneously
for both players, if s yields the only remaining strategies after n rounds of deletion,
we have that player 1 will not invest if his signal was below bn(0) = b(bn−1(0)) given
that he knows that player 2 will (in the worst case) not invest if he observes a signal
lower than bn−1(0). Hence, with every round of deletion the interval where there is
no dominated strategy becomes smaller. With b being strictly increasing and having
the only fix point at 1
2
, both values bn−1(1) and bn−1(0) tend to 1
2
for n becoming
large. Therefore, 1
2
is the uniquely selected switching point.
With this approach, Morris and Shin (2001) give more general results for games
with finitely and infinitely many players and more general payoff functions. The
fashion of the logics behind stays the same. Only the payoffs are adjusted depending
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on the amount of players that invest. Players then consider a posterior belief about
the amount of other players that observe a signal in order to make them invest.
Again, there are unique best replies for high and low observed noisy values of θ
and iterated deletion of dominated strategies with higher order beliefs leaves the
agents with a single switching threshold. One important difference when going to
infinitely many players is that the precision of the signal plays an important role.
If precision gets high enough, the existence of a unique equilibrium is guaranteed.
Moreover, in the limit of the signal becoming infinitely precise, the failure probability
of the investment project can be determined depending on the distribution of the
fundamental variable which, for instance, can be used to price debt (see Morris and
Shin 2004).
2.3.4. The Multiple Creditor Case
Returning to the credit prolongation problem of section 2.3.2 and taking a look at
the limit case as information becomes infinitely precise, I define pi(l, θ) = u(1, l, θ)−
u(0, l, θ)
• pi(l, θ)=
R2 −K if z(1− l) ≤ θ−K if z(1− l) > θ,
• ∫ 1
l=0
pi(l, θ)dl=

−K if θ ≤ 0
R2 −K if z ≤ θ
θR2
z
−K else .
Theorem 2.1. The unique switching point is given by θ∗ = Kz
R2
.
• Proof. The proof is a special case of Morris and Shin 2001. In order to make their
result applicable, I have to ensure that the following assumptions are satisfied.
• pi(l, θ) is non decreasing in l
• pi(l, θ) is non decreasing in θ
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• ∃!θ∗ with ∫ 1
l=0
pi(l, θ∗)dl = 0
• There exist θ ∈ R, θ ∈ R and ε > 0 such that pi(l, θ) ≤ − for all l ∈ [0, 1] and
θ ≤ θ and pi(l, θ) >  for all l ∈ [0, 1] and θ ≥ θ
• ∫ 1
l=0
g(l)pi(l, x)dl is continuous with respect to x and weakly continuous with
respect to a density g
• ∫∞
z=−∞ zg(z)dz is well defined.
The first two points are satisfied as R2 is positive and the third point is also true only
for the case θ∗ = Kz
R2
. The fourth point is satisfied since K > 0 and R2−K > 0. The
fifth point is satisfied as the payoff function has only a single jump. The sixth point
is satisfied as we have chosen a normal distribution. We can thus use the results
of Morris and Shin 2001. As σ becomes sufficiently small the optimal strategy for
the creditor is to roll over the loan exactly if xi ≥ KzR2 as the unique switching point
is determined via the unique solution of
∫ 1
l=0
pi(l, θ∗)dl = 0. Morris and Shin 2004
show that in the limit of σ going to 0 the state where the project is on the verge of
failing coincides with θ∗ = Kz
R2
and the project will succeed if and only if θ > θ∗.
We see that compared to the single creditor case we have a coordination loss in
the lower state. The value of this coordination loss can be specified as (F (Kz
R2
) −
F (0))Yl. Government measures to reestablish coordination might thus have a welfare
enhancing effect if there is a coordination problem.
3. The Effort Case
Assume now that the manager can shift probabilities in the following way:
ph(e) = p
0
h + e
pm(e) = p
0
m
pl(e) = p
0
l − e
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with ph + pm + pl = 1 and effort e such that all probabilities are within (0, 1).
The manager can exert effort to shift probability mass from the low state to the
high state at a cost c(e) = 1
2
ηe2 with η > 0 and gets a compensation wh, wm
or wl by the principal depending on the outcome of the project. When exerting
this kind of effort the probability distribution is shifted to another one that first
order stochastically dominates the former one. The cost can be seen as the cost
for investigating different investment opportunities with decreasing improvement as
more alternatives are analyzed. As we assume principal and agent to be limitedly
liable we have that wh, wm, wl ≥ 0.
The manager wants to maximize his expected utility
phwh + pmwm + plwl − 1
2
ηe2.
3.1. A Single Creditor
I assume that there is a contractible repayment R1 for the high and medium state
with payoffs Yh and Ym large enough such that we have an interior solution and
R1 can be refunded, while the repayment R2 in the low state is exogenously given
and repayable in case of Yl. Due to limited liability, 0 is paid back in the case
of default. Keeping R2 in the low state exogenous simplifies the problem. If the
interest rate for the low state was contractible and even paid back in case of a bailout,
exorbitant interest rates would distort the problem severely. For the bailout case
the government will repay the nominal value L. The common expected bailout
probability is denoted by β. The risk neutral creditor participates if the expected
return of the project is at least the market return 1 + r
(1 + r)L = (ph + pm)R1 + pl(1− F (0))R2 + plF (0) max(K, βL)
The maximum arises from the fact that the creditor will leave the project early for
some collateral of value K as long as the bailout probability is not high enough. If
the critical point β = K
L
is reached, the default value for the creditor is increasing.
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Any bailout strategy below this value has no effect in the single creditor problem.
Above this value, a further increase of β will make the creditor demand less R1.
In general, the kink is no drawback in the optimization problem. The demanded
minimal return R1 can thus be calculated as
R1 =
(1 + r)L− pl(1− F (0))R2 + plF (0) max(K, βL)
ph + pm
.
We assume that the creditors participate in the project if the expected return equals
the market interest rate. The principal wants to maximize his expected profits
Π = ph(Yh −R1 − wh) + pm(Ym −R1 − wm) + pl(1− F (0))(Yl −R2 − wl).
Lemma 3.1. w∗l = w
∗
m = 0
Proof. Since the payments to the manager have to be nonnegative and the project
return might be 0 in the low state, we must have that w∗l = 0. As the probability of
the medium state cannot be influenced by the agent it is optimal for the principal
to set w∗m = 0.
In the following we will denote wh by w.
The optimal effort decision for the agent given the bonus payment w is then
e∗ =
w
η
.
We can see that higher bonuses induce more effort while a higher cost factor η
reduces the effort level. The optimal bonus payment for the principal is
w∗ = max
[
0,
1
2
(Yh − ηph − (1− F (0))Yl − F (0)(max(K, βL))
]
and the optimal effort is given by
e∗ = max
[
0,
1
2η
(Yh − ηph − (1− F (0))Yl − F (0) max(K, βL))
]
.
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If the high state has a sufficiently high return, the optimal bonus is always positive.
On the other hand, if effort is sufficiently costly, the optimal bonus and effort are 0.
Later we will see that too small values of η also do not admit interior solutions as
they might push the probabilities to the boundary of 0 or 1. We can also already
observe that a bailout strategy by the government might lead to a flat compensation
scheme of 0.
Proposition 3.1. In an interior solution of the single creditor effort problem and
if β ≥ K
L
an increase in bailout probability
• decreases the manager bonus
• decreases the effort of the manager
• increases the default probability of the bank
• decreases the expected utility of the manager.
If β < K
L
an increase in bailout probability has locally no effect.
Proof. Taking the derivative of w∗ with respect to β at an interior solution yields
−1
2
F (0)L < 0.
Hence the manager bonus is decreasing in expected bailout probability. As a direct
consequence the effort is decreasing since e∗ = w
η
. Having the default probabil-
ity F (0)(p0l − e∗), the bank’s default probability is increasing in expected bailout
probability. The agents expected utility is given by(
p0h +
w
η
)
w − 1
2
η
(
w
η
)2
= p0hw +
w2
2η
which is increasing in w. Hence, the expected return for the agent is decreasing
in increased bailout probability. The case β < K
L
is trivial since max(K, βL) stays
constant.
The rationale behind this is that a bailout strategy by the government indirectly
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increases the value of the low state. As the creditor might get bailed out in the low
state, he demands less interest for his loan and the punishment for the principal
for not inducing effort to shift probability away from the low state gets weaker.
Therefore, the principal has less reasoning for incentivizing the agent to exert effort.
As a consequence, wage and effort decrease.
3.2. Multiple Creditors
In the multiple creditor case creditors face the former mentioned coordination prob-
lem. Incorporating an expected bailout probability modifies the coordination prob-
lem of section 2.3.2 by
• u(1, l, θ)=
R2 if z(1− l) ≤ θβL if z(1− l) > θ,
• u(0, l, θ) = K
In case of a default the expected return for the creditors is now βL instead of 0. If
βL ≥ K there is no coordination problem as staying in the project is always the
optimal choice for the creditors. If βL < K our assumptions of section 2 are again
satisfied and we have that
θˆ =
(K − βL)z
R2 − βL .
Thus, define
θ∗ =

(K−βL)z
R2−βL if βL < K
0 if βL ≥ K.
Hence, when increasing the bailout probability from 0 to K
L
we decrease the coordi-
nation loss from Yl
(
F
(
Kz
R2
)
− F (0)
)
to 0. The coordination loss depending on β is
given by
Yl
(
F
(
(K − βL)z
R2 − βL
)
− F (0)
)
.
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The creditors participation constraint is now
(1 + r)L = (ph + pm)R1 + pl(1− F (θ∗))R2 + plF (θ∗) max(K, βL).
The demanded minimal return R1 is then given by
R1 =
(1 + r)L− pl(1− F (θ∗))R2 + plF (θ∗) max(K, βL)
ph + pm
.
The principal wants to maximize expected profits
Π = ph(Yh −R1 − w) + pm(Ym −R1) + pl(1− F (θ∗))(Yl −R2).
The optimal bonus payment for the principal is
w∗ = max
[
0,
1
2
(
Yh − ηp0h − (1− F (θ∗))Yl − F (θ∗) max(K, βL)
)]
and the optimal effort is given by
e∗ = max
[
0,
1
2η
(
Yh − ηp0h − (1− F (θ∗))Yl − F (θ∗) max(K, βL)
)]
.
This time we have two different effects of an increase of a bailout policy. Starting
at 0 the value θ∗ gets shifted from Kz
R2
to 0 until β reaches the kink value K
L
. Until
reaching this value, the project collapses if θ is below this value and else succeeds.
After reaching this point, credits will always be prolonged as the expected bailout
value dominates the collateral.
Proposition 3.2. In an interior solution of the multiple creditor effort problem an
increase in bailout probability
• decreases the manager bonus
• decreases the effort of the manager
• decreases the expected utility of the manager.
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Proof. Again, taking the derivative of w∗ with respect to β at an interior solution
yields
−1
2
F (θ∗)L < 0.
Hence, the manager bonus is decreasing in expected bailout probability and so is
the effort. As seen before the agents expected utility is increasing in w. Thus, the
expected return for the agent is decreasing in increased bailout probability.
The qualitative effects on effort and bonus payments of the multiple creditor case
can also be found in the single creditor case, at least if bailout probabilities are
sufficiently high. Only the effect on default probability becomes ambiguous when
introducing a coordination problem. We will analyze the effect of multiplicity of
creditors in the following.
3.3. The Effect of Multiplicity of Creditors
Having analyzed the optimal manager bonuses as well as the implications of a bailout
strategy for both cases we can now take a look at what the impact of multiplicity
of creditors is compared to a single creditor. I will use the subscripts MC and SC
for the multiple creditor case and the single creditor case, respectively.
Proposition 3.3. The multiple creditor case wage is at least the single creditor case
wage w∗MC ≥ w∗SC. Especially, if there is no coordination problem (i.e. βL ≥ K) we
have w∗MC = w
∗
SC and if there is a coordination problem we have w
∗
MC > w
∗
SC.
Proof. The optimal wages only differ in the term of the distribution function of θ
w∗MC =
1
2
(Yh − ηph − (1− F (θ∗))Yl − F (θ∗) max(K, βL))
w∗SC =
1
2
(Yh − ηph − (1− F (0))Yl − F (0) max(K, βL))
60
3 THE EFFORT CASE
It is easy to show that the first part of the term dominates max(K, βL)
w∗SC − w∗MC = (1− F (θ∗))Yl − (1− F (0))Yl + F (θ∗) max(K, βL)
−F (0) max(K, βL)
= (F (θ∗)− F (0))(max(K, βL)− Yl) ≤ 0.
While the former term is at least 0, the latter term is negative. The former term is 0
exactly when there is no coordination problem and positive if there is a coordination
problem.
Corollary 3.1. The multiple creditor case effort is at least the single creditor case
effort e∗MC ≥ e∗SC. Especially, if there is no coordination problem (i.e. βL ≥ K) we
have e∗MC = e
∗
SC and if there is a coordination problem we have e
∗
MC > e
∗
SC.
We see that multiplicity of creditors increases the manager bonus if there is an effort
problem in the agency setting. The mechanism behind this is that multiplicity of
creditors devalues the lower state due to the coordination problem. The difference
between the high and the low state increases which makes it more valuable for the
principal to invest in incentivizing a probability shift away from the low state to
the high state. Multiplicity of creditors has the opposite effect of a bailout policy
since the bailout policy aims at enhancing the value of the low state. Nonetheless,
we observe a bonus decrease in both settings with respect to an increased bailout
probability. The effect of an increased bailout probability on bonuses in the multiple
creditor case can even be observed below the point of full coordination where both
scenarios are identical. Below the critical value, the coordination effect is the driving
force which is only influencing the problem in the multiple creditor case. Above the
critical value, there is no coordination effect and we have exactly the same behavior
in both cases. An important difference lies in the effect of the bailout strategy with
respect to the failure probability of the project. While in the single creditor model
bailout interventions have a clear negative effect on the default probability, in the
multiple creditor case this effect is ambiguous. For low β the lower wage induces
a probability shift from the high state to the low state. On the other hand the
conditional probability at the low state is shifted away from default. The effect on
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the failure probability heavily depends on the structure of the distribution function
of θ. Any increase in bailout probability above K
L
only has the negative effect
of an increase in default probability. Whether an increase in bailout probability
increases or decreases the default probability up to the critical point depends on the
severeness of the coordination problem. Especially if the ratio
F
(
Kz
R2
)
F (0)
gets large, the
coordination problem is severe.
Proposition 3.4. ∃c > 0 : if F (0) < c then the default probability for β = K
L
is
lower than for β = 0.
Proof. Denoting the bailout case β = K
L
with BO the default probabilities are given
by (p0l −wMC)F
(
Kz
R2
)
and (p0l −wBO)F (0). Both default probabilities are positive.
Taking the limit in the bailout case of F (0) towards 0 the default probability tends
to 0. Hence, a lower default probability for the bailout case can be observed than
for the case where β = 0.
The default probability depending on beta
In the graphic we see that the overall default probability is decreasing in expected
bailout probability for low expected bailout probabilities since the coordination effect
62
3 THE EFFORT CASE
in the low state is stronger than the probability shifting effect to the low state caused
by moral hazard. The kink is the point where β = K
L
and we have reached full
coordination. From that point on, any increase in bailout probability only has the
effect of probability shifting to the low state.
3.4. Welfare Analysis and Policy Implications
Having analyzed multiple effects of this simple model we will take a look at policy
implications. The main question from a welfare perspective apart from the failure
probability is whether the net value of this project increases or decreases.
3.4.1. Single Creditor
A social planner who wants to maximize the net value faces the problem of maxi-
mizing
(p0h + e)Yh + (p
0
m)Ym + (p
0
h − e)(1− F (0))Yl −
1
2
ηe2.
The optimal effort he would implement is then given by
e∗FB =
Yh − (1− F (0))Yl
η
.
Comparing this to the second best effort at an interior solution
e∗SB =
1
2η
(Yh − ηph − (1− F (0))Yl − F (0) max(K, βL))
we can state that the agency problem causes underinvestment of effort. As the
objective for the social planner is a quadratic function of effort, even lower effort,
as caused by a bailout policy, exacerbates the underinvestment problem. Since
governmental costs of the bailout are just a redistribution in this model we observe a
worsening of the net value of the project. Having analyzed the net value it is natural
to ask whether single parties of this model benefit from a bailout. We have seen in the
previous section that the expected utility for the agent is decreasing. As the creditor
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in this model is always kept at the break even point for participating, he neither
benefits nor is a bailout to his detriment. A bailout policy is not desired by the
social planner as it has negative net value effects and worsens the underinvestment
problem.
3.4.2. Multiple Creditors
In the multiple creditor case the optimal effort he would implement is then given by
e∗FB =
Yh − (1− F (θ∗))Yl
η
.
Comparing this to the second best effort at an interior solution
e∗SB =
1
2η
(Yh − ηph − (1− F (θ∗))Yl − F (θ∗) max(K, βL)),
again, as in the single creditor case, we observe an underinvestment of effort com-
pared to the first best case.
If we compare the difference of the first best effort to the second best effort for the
single creditor case and the multiple creditor case, we see that the underinvestment
problem is more severe in the multiple creditor case. In this sense, the coordination
failure problem not only has the classical direct effect on welfare via the coordination
loss, but further an indirect effect that worsens the effort choice problem in this
principal agent setting.
4. The Risk Effort Case
In contrast to the preceding chapter I assume that the manager can shift probability
mass from the medium state to both, the high and the low state and vice versa.
The idea is that a manager usually is not only able to influence the return but also
the variance of a portfolio. It is often criticized that managed portfolios do not
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outperform benchmarks and managers, instead of acting in the desired way of the
principal, even increase risk in order to maximize bonus payments. The controlling
of the risk choice is often not possible for the bank or investor. Assume now that
the manager can shift probabilities in the following way:
ph(a) = p
0
h + a
pm(a) = p
0
m − (1 + κ)a
pl(a) = p
0
l + κa
with ph+pm+pl = 1, κ > 0 and effort a such that all probabilities are within (0, 1).
As the aim is to model an increase in the variance, an appropriate choice of κ would
create a mean preserving spread of the original distribution.
Proposition 4.1. If Yl is 0, κ =
Yh−Ym
Ym
yields a mean preserving spread. For positive
Yl, κ =
Yh−Ym
Ym−(1−F (0))YL yields a mean preserving spread in the full coordination case
and decreases the mean in the other cases.
As the value in the lower state depends on the coordination of creditors we can
not choose a parameter such that we create a mean preserving spread in any case.
The choice of κ = Yh−Ym
Ym−(1−F (0))YL ensures that we do not have an increase in return
and is a safe way to separate our results from the effects of the previous section
where the mean was increased by managerial effort. The manager can exert effort
to shift probability mass at a cost c(a) = 1
2
αa2 and as in the previous chapter gets
a compensation wh, wm or wl by the principal depending on the outcome of the
project. The agent remains limitedly liable such that we have wh, wm, wl ≥ 0.
The manager wants to maximize his expected utility E[u(a)] = phwh + pmwm +
plwl − 12αa2.
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4.1. A Single Creditor
The break even condition for the creditors and the demanded return are the same
as in the previous section and the principal wants to maximize
Π = ph(Yh −R1 − wh) + pm(Ym −R1 − wm) + pl(1− F (0))(Yl −R2 − wl).
As in Hakenes and Schnabel we set w∗l = w
∗
m = 0. In the following we will denote
wh by w. The optimal effort decision for the agent given the bonus payment w is
then
a∗ =
w
α
.
The optimal bonus payment for the principal is
w∗ = max
[
0,
1
2
(Yh − αph − (1 + κ)Ym + (1− F (0))κYl + κF (0)(max(K, βL))
]
and the optimal effort is given by
a∗ = max
[
0,
1
2α
(Yh − αph − (1 + κ)Ym + (1− F (0))κYl + κF (0)(max(K, βL))
]
.
Again, if effort is sufficiently costly, the optimal bonus and effort are 0. Choosing
κ = Yh−Ym
Ym−(1−F (0))YL as proposed earlier, this simplifies to
w∗ = max
[
0,
1
2
(F (0))
(
Yh − Ym
Ym − (1− F (0))YL max(K, βL)
)
− αph
]
.
One can observe that a necessary condition for the wage to be positive is that the
collateral or bailout probability is sufficiently high. Obviously, as the incentivizing
would be at best mean preserving, there have to be other factors in order to achieve a
positivity result for the bonus. The driving force is that risk can be shifted towards
the government or the insurance of the collateral in this agency setting. In the
proceeding of this chapter we assume that we are at conditions that guarantee a
positive bonus. Due to the maximum function in the optimum we again only focus
on bailout probabilities that exceed the critical value. Below this value, an increase
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of bailout probability has no influence.
Proposition 4.2. In an interior solution of the single creditor risk effort problem
an increase in bailout probability
• increases the manager bonus
• increases the effort of the manager
• increases the default probability of the bank
• increases the expected utility of the manager.
Proof. Taking the derivative of w∗ with respect to β at an interior solution yields
κF (0)L
2
> 0.
Hence the manager bonus is increasing in expected bailout probability. As a direct
consequence the effort is increasing since e∗ = w
α
. Having the default probability
F (0)(p0l +κa
∗), the banks default probability is increasing in expected bailout prob-
ability. The agent’s expected utility is again increasing in w. Hence, the expected
return for the agent is increasing in bailout probability.
This time, the rationale behind this is that a bailout strategy by the government,
as before, indirectly increases the value of the low state. As the creditor might get
bailed out in the low state, he demands less interest for his loan. The difference
to the previous chapter is that the principal originally incentivized the agent to
shift probability mass away from the low state. In the risk shifting problem, the
principal wants the manager to shift risk to the low state. If now the punishment
for the low state via the return demand of the creditors gets lowered, the principal
might finance even higher effort taking by the agent via incentivizing even more.
According to that, bonus and effort increase.
67
4 THE RISK EFFORT CASE
4.2. Multiple Creditors
We proceed as before and receive the optimal bonus payment for the principal as
w∗ = max
[
0,
1
2
(Yh − αph − (1 + κ)Ym + (1− F (θ∗))κYl + κF (θ∗) max(K, βL))
]
and the optimal effort is given by
a∗ = max
[
0,
1
2α
(Yh − αph − (1 + κ)Ym + (1− F (θ∗))κYl + κF (θ∗) max(K, βL))
]
.
Proposition 4.3. In an interior solution of the single creditor effort problem an
increase in bailout probability
• increases the manager bonus
• increases the effort of the manager
• increases the expected utility of the manager.
Proof. The proof follows the reasoning of the previous chapter.
4.3. The Effect of Multiplicity of Creditors
Having analyzed the optimal manager bonuses as well as the implications of a bailout
strategy for both cases we can now take a look at what the impact of multiplicity
of creditors is compared to a single creditor.
Proposition 4.4. The multiple creditor case wage is at most the single creditor case
wage w∗MC ≤ w∗SC. Especially, if there is no coordination problem (i.e. βL ≥ K) we
have w∗MC = w
∗
SC and if there is a coordination problem we have w
∗
MC < w
∗
SC.
Proof. The optimal wages only differ in the term of the distribution function of θ
w∗MC =
1
2
(Yh − αph − (1 + κ)Ym + (1− F (θ∗))κYl + κF (θ∗) max(K, βL))
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w∗SC =
1
2
(Yh − αph − (1 + κ)Ym + (1− F (0))κYl + κF (0) max(K, βL))
It is easy to show that the Yl term dominates ((1− β)K + βL))
w∗SC − w∗MC = (1− F (0))κYl − (1− F (θ∗))κYl
−κF (θ∗) max(K, βL) + κF (0) max(K, βL)
= (F (θ∗)− F (0))(Yl −max(K,L)) ≥ 0.
While the former term is at least 0 the latter term is positive. The former term is
positive exactly if there is a coordination problem.
We see that multiplicity of creditors decreases the manager bonus if there is a
risk shifting problem in the agency setting. The mechanism behind this is that
multiplicity of creditors devalues the lower state due to the coordination problem.
This time, however, the principal wants to incentivize the low state. As the low
state now, via the higher demanded repayment for creditors, becomes less valuable,
incentivizing the same return becomes more costly. Therefore, incentives set are
lower in the multiple creditor case. Nonetheless, an increase in bailout probability
increases the manager bonus in both setting. Again, above the critical value the
effects coincide. Here, the enhanced value of the low state due to the bailout policy
is the driving force. Below the critical value, there is no effect in the single creditor
case, but a coordination effect in the multiple creditor case. The coordination effect
acts in the same direction as the effect above the critical value.
4.4. Welfare Analysis and Policy Implications
Having analyzed multiple effects of this simple model we will take a look at policy
implications. The main question from a welfare perspective apart from the failure
probability is whether the net value of this project increases or decreases.
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4.4.1. Single Creditor
A social planner who wants to maximize the net value faces the problem of maxi-
mizing
(p0h + a)Yh + (p
0
m − (1 + κ)a)Ym + (p0h + κa)(1− F (0))Yl −
1
2
αa2.
The optimizing effort he would implement is then given by
Yh − (1 + κ)Ym + κ(1− F (0))Yl
α
.
By construction of κ the project net value is not increasing in costly effort and it is
easily computed that any effort is not desirable in this context. As negative effort
is excluded it is
a∗FB = 0.
Comparing this to the second best effort at an interior solution
a∗SB = max
[
0,
1
2α
(Yh − αph − (1 + κ)Ym + (1− F (0))κYl + κF (0)(max(K, βL))
]
we can state that the agency problem causes overinvestment of effort. As the ob-
jective for the social planner is a quadratic function of effort, even higher effort,
as caused by a bailout policy, exacerbates the overinvestment problem. Since gov-
ernmental costs of the bailout are just a redistribution in this model we observe a
worsening of the net value of the project. Having analyzed the net value, again,it is
natural to ask whether single parties of this model benefit from a bailout. We have
seen in the previous section that the expected utility for the agent is increasing. The
creditor in this model, as previously stated, is always kept at the break even point
for participating, he neither benefits nor is a bailout to his detriment. A bailout
policy is not desired by the social planner as it has only negative net value effects
and worsens the overinvestment problem.
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4.4.2. Multiple Creditors
In the multiple creditor case the optimal effort he would implement is again given
by
a∗FB = 0.
Comparing this to the second best effort at an interior solution
a∗SB = max
[
0,
1
2α
(Yh − αph − (1 + κ)Ym + (1− F (θ∗))κYl + κF (θ∗) max(K, βL))
]
,
again, as in the single creditor case, we observe an overinvestment of effort compared
to the first best case.
If we compare the difference of the first best effort to the second best effort for
the single creditor case and the multiple creditor case, this time we see that the
overinvestment problem is more severe in the single creditor case. This is due to
the fact that the first best effort is at its boundary value 0 and the second best
effort is higher in the single creditor case. The coordination problem weakens the
overinvestment induced by the agency problem.
5. Discussion
5.1. Comparison with Hakenes and Schnabel
Hakenes and Schnabel 2014 consider the internal and external agency problem in
the trinomial setup. They utilize a two period model in order to show the most
important effects of the moral hazard problem and the effects an increased expecta-
tion of bailout probability has on wages and managerial effort. The most important
differences to their paper are the introduction of collateral, credit prolongation and
the case of multiple creditors. As soon as we reach the critical value for the bailout
probability β = KL we have full coordination and a decision of the creditors to
prolong the loan. Thus, for high values of β that exceed this critical value, our re-
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sults are consistent with Hakenes and Schnabel. For lower values we have different
effects depending on whether we have a coordination problem or a single creditor.
In the single creditor case the option of falling back on insured collateral leads to no
effect of increased bailout probabilities if these are low enough. Creditors will still
leave early in t = 1 and therefore still demand the same return for the repayment
R1. This keeps the behavior of the other participants in our model constant. In
the multiple creditor case, there is a coordination effect for low values of β. This
coordination effect can be observed exactly until the critical state β = K
L
. The
coordination effect shifts R1 in the same direction as the bailout effect in Hakenes
and Schnabel but for completely different reasons. In Hakenes and Schnabel the
increased value in case of a default is what shifts R1 and eventually leads to an
increase of default probability. In my model an increase of default value leads to
better coordination and therefore shifts probability away from the default state as
a first reaction. As a result, the lower states overall gets more value but not neces-
sarily the case of default. Only the feedback of the principal agent problem via the
shifted demanded repayment R1 might lead to increased default probabilities if β is
low. While in Hakenes and Schnabel the participants only “gamble” on a default
at the cost of the government (which is equal to the value of the default state), in
my model and if β is low they take the increased risk of reaching the low state due
to better coordination probabilities and even for cases of less expected value of the
default state. For higher β the reasonings for the participants’ behavior fall back
to the case of Hakenes and Schnabel. Depositors in Hakenes and Schnabel fulfill a
similar role as the government as long as the risk premium for the deposit insurance
is fixed. Therefore, I do not focus on depositors.
5.2. The Combined Case
As different effects can be observed in the effort and the risk shifting case, the general
agency problem might very likely include both issues. Calculations show that one
driving factor are the cost parameters for the types of effort. If risk shifting becomes
expensive, the effort problem dominates and vice versa. While the wage and effort
conclusions become ambiguous in the combined case, the impact of an increased
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bailout probability on the default probability for high bailout probabilities persists
in a negative manner. Only for low bailout probabilities the default probability
might decrease. Thus the combined model offers no new insight except for having
the effects of both single models at once. Hakenes and Schnabel argue that in the
combined case the parameter space of the cost parameters for which risk shifting
dominates and bonus caps are useful is increasing in β. This is also true in my model
for large increases as for large β collateral and coordination effects vanish. Still, if
β is sufficiently low, we cannot conclude that the parameter space is increasing.
5.3. Alternative Managerial Effort and Costs
The quadratic cost function for exerting effort guarantees an easy way to ensure a
finite solution due to its convex structure when combined with a linear influence of
effort on the probabilities. In our model, as in the model of Hakenes and Schnabel
and the model of Besley and Ghatak, the parameter space for the effort therefore
has to be restricted in order that the probabilities do not exceed the boundaries
0 and 1. We will briefly give an example in the effort case of an alternative way
of modeling the influence of effort, keeping the parameter space less restricted and
showing that a convex cost structure is not needed. I model the managers influence
on the probabilities in the following way:
ph(e) = p
0
h +
e
1 + e
p
pm(e) = p
0
m
pl(e) = p
0
l −
e
1 + e
p
with p = min(p0l , 1− p0h) and a cost function
c(e) = −ηp2 1 + 2e
2(e+ 1)2
.
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In this fashion we can allow the choice variable e to take values in the interval [0,∞).
The optimization problem of the agent is then the maximization of(
p0h +
e
1 + e
p
)
w + ηp2
1 + 2e
2(e+ 1)2
.
The optimality condition for the agent is
e
1 + e
p =
w
η
.
We see that an offered wage greater or equal to the cost parameter η
p
pushes effort
to infinity. This is in a way consistent with the previous modeling as in the original
model a too high wage pushes probability out of the admissible parameter space.
Having had
ph(e) = p
0
h +
w
η
at the optimal effort in the original model we can observe the same result (Assuming
that ph(e) is binding instead of pl(e)). Our alternative approach is constructed such
that the objective for the principal, after substituting the optimal behavior of the
agent and the participation constraint of the creditors, is the same as in the original
model and thus yields the same results.
6. Conclusion
If there are sufficient tools for risk monitoring and controlling for the government the
endogenously generated bonus contracts in a principal agent framework sets a too
low incentive for optimal manager behavior. An increase in bailout probability by
the government has either no effect or worsens the underinvestment of effort. Bonus
caps are thus inefficient or even harmful from a welfare perspective. Multiplicity of
creditors induces a coordination problem between the creditors having the opposite
effect on the bonus as a bailout policy. Therefore, the effect of a bailout strategy
is even bigger in the multiple creditor case since the original effect of the bailout is
accompanied by the reestablishment of coordination. Overall, there is a destruction
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of net value when there is a bailout policy.
In case of a lack of risk controlling possibilities and the manager can exert effort
in order to increase risk, things change drastically. The endogenously generated
bonus becomes too big in terms of welfare. An increase in bailout probability again
worsens the problem. This time however, as bonuses are too high, bonus caps might
be useful to accompany the bailout policy. Multiplicity of creditors, again, is a
counterdirected force to the bailout and thus strengthens the effects of an increase
in bailout probability.
As long as governments are not able to ensure a good risk management to control
the risk of financial institutions, bonus caps are a recommended tool especially if
the government is open to bailing out troubled banks.
In either setup, bailouts are ineffective or even harmful with respect to the bank’s
default probability in the single creditor case. In the multiple creditor case, up
to a critical value of bailout probability, the coordination effect might dominate
the negative effect of the agency problem. For high bailout probabilities only the
destructive effect remains. Thus, ignoring other effects like domino effects of large in-
stitutes, a government should never indicate too high bailout expectations. Keeping
the bailout expectations low, a bailout only has an effect if there is a coordination
problem. Setting the expected bailout probability just as high as to induce full
coordination might be the best from a social planner’s perspective.
In this sense, an alternative to a bailout policy might be any policy that helps
to establish confidence in the financial market in order to reestablish coordination
between creditors. Better signals and information structures due to higher risk re-
porting standards might help to coordinate to the socially better equilibrium without
the negative side effects a bailout strategy brings in via the agency problem.
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Part IV.
Bonus and Benchmark Setting for
Limitedly Liable Portfolio Managers
with Portfolio Insurance
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1. Introduction
Incentivizing a manager with bonus payments is a wide-spread concept to transfer a
company owner’s objectives to the execution of the manager. Especially in financial
markets, the discourse about the appropriate size and structure of manager bonuses
is steadily persisting in economic theory as well as on the society level. During the
last years, excessive bonuses and bonus payout in times where financial institutes
were experiencing losses or even were at the verge of going bankrupt, raised the
question whether the current handling of bonus payments is appropriate for the
financial institutes themselves and, moreover, for all connected enterprises and the
overall society. In particular when the population had to cover banks’ losses or bear
risk via government subsidies, the general question of who was benefitting by the
taken measures arose and whether the architecture of the current financial system
and their bonus payouts incentivized excessive risk taking. Specifically on markets
with complex financial products, where derivatives allow for nearly arbitrary port-
folio payoff structures, the current bonus policy was criticized. The advantages of
bonus payments are multilayered. Bonus contracts might make an agent exert effort
at a better performance level in order to achieve a bonus payment. Furthermore,
a structured payment contract might separate high skilled from low skilled agents
when allocating human capital to appropriate management positions. More general,
an agent’s utility function might be transferred via the bonus contract to resemble
the principal’s utility. Often times, the agent is more risk averse than the princi-
pal. This can be counteracted by a convex bonus scheme. An obvious disadvantage
though is the problem of moral hazard induced by bonus schemes with lower bounds
due to the limited liability aspect of the manager.
As mentioned in part III., the delegated portfolio choice problem is special in the
field of principal-agent problems. In the portfolio choice problem there are two
dimensions of asymmetric information. The agent privately chooses his effort first
as well as the structure of the portfolio afterwards, while the principal is only able
to observe the outcome of the portfolio. Although a high incentive in most cases
might induce the agent to exert more effort which is desired by the principal, a too
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big sized bonus might be harmful to the portfolio structure choice.
Empirically, most working contracts contain a payment structure that is bounded
from below. De facto, every agent is effectively limitedly liable, since he cannot cover
losses that might be arbitrary high. This leads to the possibility that, in contrast to
classic portfolio theory, an agent might not only desire volatility, but, depending on
the available financial products, prefer a portfolio with, both, low return and high
variance to a portfolio with higher return and lower variance.
The most common compensation contracts either consist of discrete benchmarks
and pay out increasing bonus amounts for each benchmark reached, so called step
function contracts, or they pay out a certain fraction of every additional profit above
a certain benchmark, so called call-type bonus contracts. Upper caps on both con-
tract types might prevent excessive risk taking but are also reasons for suboptimal
portfolio structures.
Step function bonus scheme Call-type bonus scheme
Not only the structure of the payment contract but also the type of possible in-
vestment is crucial to the analysis of optimal bonus setting and of major impor-
tance to identify where excessive risk taking might have its origin. Is the investment
choice a simple option between investing a share into a risky asset or project and
the remaining capital into a bond? Is further risk taking by exceeding the liquidity
of the initial capital possible? For fund managers who have access to sufficiently
complex financial products or the access to advanced trading strategies arbitrary
payoff structures depending on fundamental variables can be replicated. In a more
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restricted market, the manager might only be able to influence return and volatility
by exerting effort as in Hakenes and Schnabel (2014).
Other important driving features are the type of the benchmark and the time
of evaluation. Benchmarks might be static to achieve given goals or they might be
dynamic in order to make success comparable to average market success to determine
the managers performance. Static benchmarks might function as an insurance since
they are less likely to pay bonuses when overall market performance is low. In
reverse, they do not account for underperforming, market-driven success. Dynamic
benchmarks, like the comparison with indices, better identify the performance of a
manager but might also pay out bonuses when losses are realized and, thus, burden
an already stressed balance sheet.
The focus of the paper is a setup of an investor handing out money to an agent to
invest. The agent has access to sufficiently complex financial products meaning that
he can buy or replicate arbitrary measurable payoff structures.. The investor buys a
portfolio insurance to cover possible losses and incentivizes the manager in the most
simple form of a one step bonus contract. The insurance demands the portfolio to
not exceed a given risk level. In this way the problem can be divided into two parts;
optimal risk taking and optimal payoff structuring for the portfolio. Through the
risk taking in terms of possible losses, which are covered by the insurance, the agent
can generate higher payoffs in the case of success. Due to the flat bonus scheme,
the agent has no incentives to exceed the benchmark. Therefore, the investor has
to carefully choose the benchmark. As the structuring of the portfolio in order to
achieve higher benchmarks is more costly, the agent has to generate more liquidity
from risk taking. This additional generating of payoff in the success case comes at
the cost of a decreased success probability. Moreover, as the agent’s bonus is only
payed out in case of success, a higher bonus has to accompany a higher benchmark
setting in order to keep the agent incentivized. I show that in this setting excessive
risk taking is not driven by the managers bonus but the bonus is a necessary tool
for the investor to keep the agent incentivized. Apart from this, it is even of interest
of the investor to keep the bonus low. The key feature for lowering the success
probability is rather given by the benchmark setting of the investor than the bonus
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setting.
The literature in the field of delegated portfolio management is vast. Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1987) analyze the optimal structure of manager compensation. They
find that a linear contract might be the optimal contract. However, many findings
show that linear contracts are not optimal since an underinvestment in effort can be
observed in many models. A famous example is the work of Admati and Pfleiderer
(1997) who show that an agent cannot be incentivized to the benefit of the principal.
While Starks (1987) argues that symmetric contracts are desirable, it is often difficult
to implement appropriate punishment for bad outcomes into working contracts.
Most payment contracts are bounded from below and two types of contracts are
predominant. The simple bonus contract that pays a bonus if a benchmark is reached
and the call type compensation contract that pays a fixed amount and a share of the
profits if profits exceed a certain benchmark. Even if the principal claims big losses
from the agent according to the compensation contract, current volumes and risks
of portfolios can quickly lead to a loss the agent is not able to bear. Ross (2004)
and Gollier (1997) analyze the distortion of risk taking by a convex compensation
scheme and find that there are multiple effects. Ross (2004) shows that a convex
compensation scheme not necessarily increases the risk taking as scale effects might
also affect the expected utility, while Gollier shows that mean variance inefficient
portfolios in the classical sense might be selected. John and John (1993) show that a
compensation scheme might be able to reestablish the first best level of risk taking.
Empirically, there are different results on risk taking behavior. While Houston
and James (1995) find no excessive risk taking incentives in the financial sector
compared to other sectors, Cheng, Hong and Scheinkman (2010) report a significant
connection.
If financial market completeness allows for replication strategies, arbitrary portfolio
payoffs might be generated. Therefore, portfolio insurance and risk constraints for
the manager are a necessary tool in order to prevent excessive risk taking. Two
of the most common portfolio insurance approaches are the Option Based Portfolio
Insurance (OBPI) and the Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance (CPPI). The
OBPI was introduced by Leland and Rubinstein (1976). Its idea is to cover a
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portfolio invested in a risky asset by a put written on it. This guarantees that the
value of the portfolio at some terminal date will be greater than the strike price
of the put. Perold (1986) introduced the CPPI that requires a trading strategy to
hold the portfolio above a certain level at any time. As these strategies might not
be applicable if markets allow jump processes, more modern approaches try to keep
portfolio values above a benchmark with a certain confidence level or impose a risk
measure constraint to a portfolio. In particular, regulatory frameworks focus on
quantiles and risk measures in order to regulate financial markets.
Portfolio optimization under a risk measure constraint is studied in Emmer et al.
(2001) for a capital-at-risk constraint. Boyle and Tian (2007) consider the closely
related portfolio choice problem of outperforming a benchmark with a certain con-
fidence level. Fo¨llmer and Leukert (1999) investigate the optimal hedging of a port-
folio up to a certain confidence level. A new approach is followed by De Carmine
and Tankov via separating the problems of positive portfolio payoff structuring and
optimal risk taking. As a portfolio insurance only covers losses, the risk constraint
is only applied to the nonpositive part of the random variable that represents the
terminal portfolio value. The evaluation of utility of the portfolio manager is re-
stricted to the positive part as the insurance covers arbitrary losses. In this fashion,
the problem can be split into two convex problems and explicit solutions can be
obtained.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I describe the setup of the model.
I introduce the relation between principal, manager and the insurance and their
objectives. Chapter 3 describes the optimal behavior of the manager for given
incentive schemes. The agent has to choose an optimal scheme for gains and for
losses. In section 4 the optimal bonus scheme is determined. I conclude with my
results in chapter 5.
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2. The Model
I consider the problem of an investor who wants to incentivize a fund manager in
order to optimally analyze a market and structure a portfolio. The common issue
with this kind of investment problem is that the investor has incomplete or no
information about the effort choice of the fund manager and whether or not the
manager structures the portfolio in his sense. If markets allow for complex financial
investment opportunities, possible losses might be substantial. In order to avoid
substantial capital losses that might affect the operating business in other areas, a
portfolio insurance has to be effected. The insurance takes a premium as well as
giving a specification for a risk level that must not be exceeded by the portfolio
manager. The investor offers a bonus payment if a desired benchmark is achieved.
The fund manager anticipates bonus, benchmark and risk constraint in order to
choose the structure of the portfolio to maximize his utility. Therefore, the bonus
and the benchmark have to be chosen carefully by the investor in order to incentivize
an appropriate portfolio structure.
2.1. Setup
Let B ≥ 0 denote the bonus payment when the managed portfolio achieves bench-
mark b > 0. The manager/agent is equipped with an increasing and strictly concave
utility function u and reservation utility/outside option u0.
12 Without loss of gen-
erality we set the fixed part of the salary to zero.13 The terminal portfolio value is
denoted by XT . Therefore, the payment of the agent z is
z(XT )=
B if XT ≥ b0 else.
12the outside option might represent the general value of other working opportunities and total
rejection of the offer. It might also be seen as the value of taking the offer and shirking. Since
optimal effort choice is not the main focus of this paper, I assume that overall market conditions
are such that the investor is always interested in preventing shirking.
13else the utility function is simply transformed
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I assume that the insurance covers any terminal losses incurred by the portfolio and
imposes a risk constraint ρ0 specified by the entropic risk measure for a portfolio
choice X:
ρ(X) =
1
β
log(EP (e
−βX))
for some β > 0. The investor/principal hands over x0 to the agent and offers a
contract (B, b).14
The investment occurs on an arbitrage free, complete financial market. Let (Ω, F, Ft, P )
denote the filtered probability space. For simplicity, let F0 be trivial. The adapted
process of the risky asset is given by (St)0≤t≤T . For simplicity the interest rate is set
to 0 and S0t = 1 denotes a bond. An admissible, self-financing strategy is denoted
by initial capital x0 ≥ 0 and a predictable process ζ such that
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
ζsdSs.
14I assume that the investor covers the insurance and x0 is the net investment
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For the risk taking problem there is no special requirement for the admissability of
the trading strategy, while for the investment part we will temporarily demand
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
ζsdSs ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ] P − a.s.
when talking about quantile hedging. The unique martingale measure on the com-
plete market is denoted by P ∗ and the according density for the change of measure
is denoted by ξ = dP
∗
dP
. Market completeness enables the agent to replicate any
measurable (with respect to P ) random variable and therefore turns the problem
of finding an optimal trading strategy into a maximization problem on the space of
integrable random variables. Therefore, in the following, I will simply use X instead
of XT .
3. The Agent’s Problem
The agent tries to maximize his expected utility with respect to his compensation.
E[u(z(XT ))].
Since the payment to the agent is given by z=
B if XT ≥ b0 else and the market is
complete, this problem can be rewritten as
max
X∈L1(P )
P (X ≥ b)u(B)
such that
ρ(min(X, 0)) ≤ ρ0
and
E(ξX) ≤ x0.
For the risk constraint only the negative part of the random variable is applied as
the insurance is only interested in possible losses. This is a key feature for the
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separation of the portfolio choice problem into the gains and losses part. Therefore,
the agent’s problem is reduced to the problem of maximizing the probability that the
portfolio achieves the benchmark while keeping the risk below the given boundary.
Following the idea of De Franco and Tankov the portfolio problem can be divided
into two parts. First, I investigate optimal investment structures for investments
that yield a nonnegative payoff if the payoff is restricted to a subset of the state
space. This is shown by utilizing a result of Fo¨llmer and Leukert in the context of
quantile hedging. Second, the optimal risk taking can be determined by a result of
De Franco and Tankov.
3.1. Quantile Hedging
Fo¨llmer and Leukert (1999) investigate the optimal, up to a certain probability
incomplete, hedging of a portfolio. The basic idea is that a portfolio manager is
looking for the cheapest hedge while ignoring a quantile of the underlying probability
space. This problem might, for instance, be motivated by aiming to fulfill a value
at risk constraint that is imposed on the portfolio. The huge difference of quantile
hedging, compared to an optimal portfolio choice problem, is that the hedge should
almost surely have a positive payoff. In this way, the problem is mathematically
well defined and does not permit arbitrary speculations on the financial market.
Although the problem of quantile hedging finds its major motivation in incomplete
markets where complete hedges are rather expensive and quantile hedging might be
a more executable alternative, the method works the same in complete markets. In
the following I will assume that the market is complete.
As before, (Ω, F, P ) be a probability space with filtration (Ft) and S = (St)t∈[0,T ]15
a discounted price process on this space. An admissible, self-financing strategy is
given by initial capital V0 ≥ 0 and a predictable process ζ that fulfill
Vt = V0 +
∫ t
0
ζsdSs ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ [0, T ] P − a.s.
15In this part I will put a focus on the Black and Scholes model, Fo¨llmer and Leukert give results
for general semi-martingales
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Let P ∗ denote the unique equivalent martingale measure on the complete market
and H ∈ L1(P ) the perfect hedge for portfolio that is to be hedged. Fo¨llmer and
Leukert show that the problem of finding the optimal trading strategy for hedging
the portfolio up to a certain probability is equivalent to the problem of finding a
subset of the state space where hedging is the cheapest. The transformed problem
can be stated in the following way:
min
A∈FT
E∗[H1A]
such that
P [A] ≥ 1− ε
for some ε ∈ (0, 1).
A is the part of the state space where the portfolio is perfectly hedged. Now A
should be chosen such that the incomplete hedge H1A is as cheap as possible while
keeping the failure probability of the overall hedge at most at ε. Let Q∗ be given by
dQ∗
dP ∗
=
H
E∗[H]
and
b˜ = inf
{
b : P
[
dQ∗
dP
> b
]
≤ ε
}
.
Moreover, let the success ratio be defined as
φ = 1HT +
VT
H
1VT<H ,
and let
φ˜ = 1 dQ∗
dP
<b˜
+ γ1 dQ∗
dP
=b˜
as well as
γ =
(1− ε)− P [dQ∗
dP
< b˜]
P [dQ
∗
dP
= b˜]
.
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Fo¨llmer and Leukert show that
Theorem 3.1 (Fo¨llmer and Leukert). Let ζ˜ be the perfect hedge for H˜ = Hφ˜ and
define V˜0 = E
∗[H˜]. Then (V˜0, ζ˜) has minimal cost under all admissible strategies
(V0, ζ) with E[φ] ≥ 1− ε and we have E[φ˜] = 1− ε.
The problem of finding the cheapest hedge for a given failure probability is closely
related to the problem of finding the hedge that minimizes the failure probability
while keeping the costs of the hedge below a given threshold. If a perfect hedge
cannot be afforded due to liquidity constraints or is economically not desired16, a
portfolio manager might search for the part of the state space where hedging is the
cheapest. Fo¨llmer and Leukert show that the problem of finding the optimal trading
strategy is, again, closely related to finding the optimal part of the state space where
the hedge should be effective. Let V˜0 denote the available liquidity. The transformed
problem can then be stated as follows:
max
A∈FT
P (A)
such that
E[ξH1A] ≤ V˜0.
Theorem 3.2 (Fo¨llmer and Leukert). Let
a˜ = inf
{
a : Q∗
[
dP
dP ∗
> aH
]
≤ V0
H0
}
and
γ =
V˜0
H0
−Q∗[ dP
dP∗ > a˜H]
Q∗[ dP
dP ∗ = a˜H]
.
The optimal trading strategy for the hedging problem is given by (V˜0, ζ˜) where ζ˜
replicates the option H˜ = Hφ˜ with φ˜ = 1 dP
dP∗>a˜H
+ γ1 dP
dP∗=a˜H
.
From Fo¨llmer and Leukert we know that the problem of finding an optimal trading
strategy is equivalent to the problem of finding the best part of the state space where
16On incomplete markets hedging might be overly expensive
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the perfect hedge should be effective. The part of the state space where hedging is
the cheapest is characterized by the density dP
∗
dP
and the boundary b˜. The correction
term γ adjusts for the (probabilistic unlikely) case that P [dQ
∗
dP
< b˜] < 1 − ε. The
idea of finding the best hedging region is very similar to finding the region that
yields the best test in statistics when testing for a hypothesis. In fact, the proof of
Fo¨llmer and Leukert is very similar and utilizes the Neymann-Pearson lemma. We
will stick to optimizing over subsets of the state space later, when we will analyze
optimal risk taking. Before, we will take a closer look at two special applications of
these results.
3.1.1. Quantile Hedging in the Black-Scholes Model
In the Black-Scholes model the price process is given by
dSt = St(σdWt +mdt), S0 = s0
where W is a standard Wiener process and m and σ > 0 are constant. With the
unique equivalent martingale measure given by
dP ∗
dP
= e−
m
σ
WT− 12 (mσ )2T
and the equation for the price process given by
ST = s0e
σWT+(m− 12σ2)T
the density can be rewritten depending only on a constant c and the stock price:
dP ∗
dP
= cS
− m
σ2
T .
From Fo¨llmer and Leukert we know that the optimal set where the portfolio is
partially hedged on is given by
A =
{
dP
dP ∗
> dH
}
.
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Therefore, the optimal hedge can be calculated explicitly depending on the state
price density and the structure of the claim. For constant claims the the optimal
hedging region can be determined in an easy way.
3.1.2. Quantile Hedging a Constant Claim
For the proceedings of this paper the quantile hedge of a constant claim is of special
interest. The agent in the principal-agent problem is incentivized by a simple bonus
contract. As seen before, he is interested in maximizing the probability of at least
hitting the benchmark. As we will see later, it is a direct consequence that the
agent tries not to outperform this benchmark as this does not increase his expected
bonus payments while it would be costly. Therefore, flat payoff derivatives, as
digital options, are of special interest. Now assume that the hedge that is to be
replicated is of constant payoff H = b for b ∈ R. The optimal quantile hedge for
any V0 < E[ξb] = b is then characterized by an acceptance region A = { dPdP ∗ > cb}
for some constant c. As b is also constant, we will replicate the digital option on
the part of the state space where state prices are low. The optimal quantile hedge
is given by a binary/digital option b1{ dP
dP∗>cb} with c such that V0 = E[ξb1{ dPdP∗>cb}].
The most important implication of this section is that long positions in a portfolio
are preferredly taken in the part of the state space where state prices are low as
investing in this area is ”cheap per probability”. For given capital, ignoring the part
of the state space where risk is incurred, it is best from the agents perspective to
generate a flat payoff scheme for the portfolio that generates payoff on the part of
the state space where state prices are low. The aim for the next part is to show that
losses are optimally incurred on the part of the state space where state prices are
high. This will finally lead to the optimal structure of the portfolio.
3.2. Optimal Risk Taking
As in the previous part we approach the optimization of the risk structure by an
optimization over subsets of the probability space. In order to identify the optimal
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structure for negative payoffs I follow the approach of De Franco and Tankov. The
problem is defined in the following way:
min
Y ∈J(A)
E[ξY ]
where
J(A) = {Y ∈ L1(ξP )|ρ(Y ) ≤ ρ0, Y = 0 on A, Y ≤ 0 on Ac}.
The problem describes that for a given part of the state space the manager is inter-
ested in the structure of the portfolio and the part of the state space that yields the
most liquidity while keeping the risk below the given level. Define
ξ = essinf ξ
and
ξ = esssup ξ.
Further, let
v(A) = inf
Y ∈J(A)
E[ξY ].
Theorem 3.3. Suppose that the law of ξ has no atom and let A ∈ F . Let c ∈ [ξ, ξ]
such that P (ξ ≤ c) = P (A) and let the risk measure be law invariant. Then
v(A) ≥ v({ξ ≤ c}).
The theorem states that if losses are realized on a part of the state space that does
not exceed a given probability boundary, there is no part that yields more liquidity
than the part that represents the highest state spaces. In the Black and Scholes
model the state price density has no atom. Further the entropic risk measure is law
invariant. The idea of the proof is the following: We partition the state space into
four parts via
B1 = {ξ ≤ c} ∩ A
B2 = {ξ > c} ∩ A
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B3 = {ξ ≤ c} ∩ Ac
B4 = {ξ > c} ∩ Ac.
The law of Y is kept on B4 and transferred from B3 to B2. By construction we have
P (B2) = P (B3).
For any given Ac with 0 < P (Ac) < 1 we keep the part of a variable Y on the
state space where {ξ > c}, i.e. B4. The remaining structure gets shifted from B3 to
B2 in order to generate a new random variable Yˆ that incurs losses only on {ξ > c},
generates the same liquidity and has at most the risk of Y according to the risk
measure. The construction is given by the following:
• f(t) = P (Y ≤ t|B3)
• g(t) = P (ξ ≤ t|B2)
• Z = g(ξ)
•W = f−1(Z)
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In the beginning, let f describe the original law for losses on B3. Points 2 and 3
generate a variable Z on B2 that has a uniform distribution on the unit interval.
Finally, the fourth point applies the original law of Y on B3 to B2. In order to
ensure that the same amount of liquidity is generated by the new variable we define:
k=
1 if W = 0 on B2E[ξY 1B3 ]
E[ξW1B2 ]
else.
Eventually, we can define
Yˆ = Y 1B4 + kW1B2 .
Let Fˆ−1 and F−1 denote the generalized inverses of the distribution functions of Yˆ
and Y , respectively. Since
• E[ξYˆ ] = E[ξY 1B4 ] + E[ξkY 1B3 ] = E[ξY ] by construction,
• P (A) = P (ξ ≤ c) by construction,
• ρ(Yˆ ) = ρ(−Fˆ−1(U)) ≤ ρ(−F−1(U)) = ρ(Y ) ≤ ρ0 by law invariance of ρ with
a uniformly distributed U on the unit interval and since Fˆ−1(u) ≤ F−1(u) for
all u ∈ [0, 1],
we have shown that losses are optimally generated on high state prices as they yield
the same amount of liquidity that they would yield on other parts of the state space
with the same probability mass, while incurring at most the risk according to the
risk measure.
The question of finiteness and whether the problem is well defined comes at hand.
It is quite obvious that for risk measures like the value at risk this type of problem
is not well defined. With the value at risk the agent can generate arbitrary liquidity
on an interval that has probability mass according to the required confidence level.
Therefore, large risk clusters are enhanced by this type of risk controlling in the
agency problem. But even for law invariant risk measures it is not certain that a
risk measure admits a finite generating of liquidity. However, De Franco and Tankov
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show that a sufficient condition for
inf
A∈F
v(A) > −∞
is given by
γmin(ξP ) <∞,
where
γmin(Q) = sup
X∈Aρ
EQ[−X]
with acceptance set A of ρ denotes the minimal penalty function in the Fenchel-
Legendre representation of convex risk measures. For the entropic risk measure
ρ(X) =
1
β
log(E(e−βX))
with β > 0 we have that the entropic risk measure can be represented by
ρ(X) = sup
Q<<P,log( dQ
dP
)∈L1(Q))
(
E
[
−dQ
dP
X
]
− βE
[
dQ
dP
log
(
dQ
dP
)])
with
γmin(ξP ) = βE[ξlog(ξ)].
17
Therefore, the entropic risk measure guarantees to leave the problem well defined in
the Black and Scholes setup. We will proceed with combining the results for positive
and negative payoffs and deduce the optimal payoff structure in the following section.
3.3. Optimal Portfolio Choice
It is easy to see that for the agent the optimal gains structure is a flat payoff scheme
when state prices are low and the optimal risk taking is realized at high state prices.
The following theorem describes the optimal portfolio choice. It is of importance
for the following theorem to notice that increasing the probability of reaching the
17see Fo¨llmer and Schied 2004
95
3 THE AGENT’S PROBLEM
benchmark is demanding more liquidity while, on the other hand, increasing the
probability mass where losses are generated, while keeping the risk at the boundary
level ρ0, generates more liquidity.
Theorem 3.4. Let us start with the trivial case. If x0 ≥ E(ξb) = b an optimal
portfolio choice is given by X = b. The more interesting and by the principal enforced
case occurs when x0 < E(ξb). The optimal portfolio choice is then given by
X∗ = b1ξ≤c∗ − β
[
log
(
β
η(c∗)
ξ
)]+
1ξ>c∗
where
α(c) = P (ξ > c)
v(c) = −βE
[(
ξlog
(
βξ
η(c)
)
∨ 1
)]
η(c) is the unique solution of E
[(
βξ
η(c)
∨ 1
)
1ξ>c
]
= e
ρ0
β + α(c)− 1
c∗ is the unique maximizer of u(B)(1− α(c)) such that E[ξb] = x0 − v(c).
Proof. The derivation of the optimal risk structure −βE[(ξlog( βξ
η(c)
)∨ 1)] is a simple
lagrange optimization after restricting the problem to the space where losses are
incurred, since the constraint is convex due to the convexity of the risk measure
and can be found in De Carmine and Tankov. The function η corresponds to the
lagrange parameter of the constraint. It is obvious that α(c) is decreasing in c. For
the dependence of v on c we observe the following: From
E
[(
βξ
η(c)
∨ 1
)
1ξ>c
]
= e
ρ0
β + α(c)− 1
we can deduce that η(c) is decreasing in c. Therefore, v(c) in increasing in c which
yields the existence of a unique solution of maximizing u(B)(1 − α(c)) such that
E[ξb] ≤ x0−v(c). Combined with the results of the previous two sections this yields
the optimal portfolio choice.
I have established the optimal portfolio choice of the agent for any given pair
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(B, b). The bonus payment has no influence on the structure of the portfolio in this
decision problem. The investor is interested in the pair that maximizes his expected
payoff. His optimal choice is part of the following chapter.
4. Optimal Contract
The investor wants to anticipate the behavior of the manager in order to maximize
the net payoff of the portfolio. His objective is given by
max
(B,b)
E[(max(XT , 0)−B)1XT≥b +max(XT , 0)1XT<b]
such that
u(B)P (XT ≥ b) ≥ u0.
Incorporating the optimal behavior of the agent and the simple observation that the
constraint will be binding in the optimum, the objective can be rewritten as
max
b
(b−B∗(b))P (ξ ≤ c∗(b)).
B∗(b) denotes the necessary bonus if the success probability 1− α is determined in
the portfolio choice problem via c∗(b) in order to ensure u(B)P (XT ≥ b) = u0. We
note that B∗(b) is an increasing function that is even strictly convex when viewed as
a function of 1− α(c∗(b)), where we recall that 1− α(c∗(b)) is the probability mass
where positive payoffs are realized when the agent chooses a portfolio for a given
benchmark.
Theorem 4.1. Let b∗ denote the unique solution to the problem
max
b
(b−B∗(b))P (ξ ≤ c∗(b)).
The optimal contract is given by the pair (B∗(b∗), b∗).
Proof. For an optimal b∗, B∗(b∗) denotes the bonus payment that keeps the partici-
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pation constraint binding. Any lower bonus would not make the agent participate,
while every higher bonus would not change the portfolio structure but decrease the
investor’s expected utility. What remains to be shown is that the overall problem
max
b
(b−B∗(b))P (ξ ≤ c∗(b))
is finite. Tankov shows that the portfolio choice problem for a strictly risk averse
agent who retains all portfolio payoffs as a compensation is finite. The overall
portfolio problem from the investor’s point of view has, due to the (with respect
to the success probability strictly convex) increased bonus demands induced by the
increased benchmark setting, strictly decreasing marginal utility for investment on
each marginal state. Therefore, the agency problem also has a finite solution.
The risk neutral investor tends to invest only into low state prices and generate
extremely high payoffs on the lowest state prices. Via the agency problem the port-
folio choice is distorted since the agent tries to reach the benchmark on a maximal
subset of the state space. Setting the benchmark higher enforces a portfolio trans-
formation closer to the desired investment structure of the principal. The strictly
concave utility of the agent limits this benchmark setting since incentivizing the
agent becomes more and more costly.
5. Conclusion
I have analyzed the optimal portfolio choice of an agent who is incentivized by a
flat bonus payment and restricted by a risk level measured via the entropic risk
measure. A flat bonus scheme leaves the size of the bonus without effect on the
portfolio structure, since on a complete market the structure of the portfolio can
be chosen such that the benchmark is exactly reached. In other models, even flat
bonus schemes might lead to increased risk taking, because payoff structures cannot
be replicated exactly and simple scaling of portfolios might increase the probability
of achieving the benchmark. In this sense, the often times criticized combination of
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complex financial products and high bonuses does not lead to higher risk taking. On
the contrary, we have seen that flat bonuses have no influence on the portfolio when
financial markets allow for complex products. The simple reason for a high bonus
size in this model is to keep the agent incentivized. The driving factor for risk taking
is the benchmark that is set by the principal. As a risk neutral principal in general is
only interested in the, from his perspective, best state prices, i.e. the low state prices,
he tries to set high benchmarks. Increasing the benchmark becomes increasingly
expensive as the decreased success probability of the portfolio has to be equalized
by increased bonus payments to the agent in order to keep him incentivized. This
also becomes increasingly expensive due to the risk aversion of the manager. From
the principal’s perspective bonuses should be as low as possible as long as the agent
accepts the contract.
Therefore, we cannot conclude that high bonuses alone are the reason for excessive
risk taking. When discussions about bonus caps arise, one should always keep in
mind that benchmarks, as well as appropriate risk controlling are substantial to this
kind of principal agent problems. Especially the wrong choice of a risk measure
might lead to portfolio choices that induce arbitrary risks on high state prices in
order to generate maximal gains on low state prices.
While it is obvious that a call-option type bonus structure would yield different
results in terms of the influence of bonus setting on risk taking, portfolio choice
models as discussed in part III. reveal that too high bonus setting might induce
higher risk taking even for flat bonus schemes. When the agent is able to (costly)
control the mean and variance of a portfolio, high bonuses might induce risk effort
that is not desired by the investor. As we have seen, this is not the case on a
complete financial market.
Literature
[1] Admati, Anat R., and Paul Pfleiderer. ”Does it all add up? Benchmarks and the
compensation of active portfolio managers*.” The Journal of Business 70.3 (1997):
99
Literature
323-350.
[2] Boyle, Phelim, and Weidong Tian. ”Portfolio management with constraints.”
Mathematical Finance 17.3 (2007): 319-343.
[3] Cheng, Ing-Haw, Harrison Hong, and Jose A. Scheinkman. Yesterday’s heroes:
Compensation and creative risk-taking. No. w16176. National Bureau of Economic
Research, 2010.
[4] Emmer, Susanne, Claudia Klu¨ppelberg, and Ralf Korn. ”Optimal portfolios with
bounded capital at risk.” Mathematical Finance 11.4 (2001): 365-384.
[5] Fo¨llmer, Hans, and Peter Leukert. ”Quantile hedging.” Finance and Stochastics
3.3 (1999): 251-273.
[6] Fo¨llmer, Hans, and Peter Leukert. ”Efficient hedging: cost versus shortfall risk.”
Finance and Stochastics 4.2 (2000): 117-146.
[7] Fo¨llmer, Hans, and Alexander Schied. Stochastic finance: an introduction in
discrete time. Walter de Gruyter, 2011.
[8] Gollier, Christian, Pierre-Franc¸ois Koehl, and Jean-Charles Rochet. ”Risk-taking
behavior with limited liability and risk aversion.” Journal of Risk and Insurance
(1997): 347-370.
[9] Hakenes, Hendrik, and Isabel Schnabel. ”Bank bonuses and bailouts.” Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 46.s1 (2014): 259-288.
[10] Holmstrom, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom. ”Aggregation and linearity in the pro-
vision of intertemporal incentives.” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric
Society (1987): 303-328.
[11] Houston, Joel F., and Christopher James. ”CEO compensation and bank risk Is
compensation in banking structured to promote risk taking?.” Journal of Monetary
Economics 36.2 (1995): 405-431.
[12] John, Teresa A., and Kose John. ”Topmanagement compensation and capital
100
Literature
structure.” The Journal of Finance 48.3 (1993): 949-974.
[13] Leland, Hayne E., and Mark Rubinstein. ”The evolution of portfolio insurance.”
Portfolio insurance: a guide to dynamic hedging, Wiley (1976).
[14] Perold, Andre. ”Constant proportion portfolio insurance.” (1986).
[15] Ross, Stephen A. ”Compensation, incentives, and the duality of risk aversion
and riskiness.” The Journal of Finance 59.1 (2004): 207-225.
[16] Starks, Laura T. ”Performance incentive fees: An agency theoretic approach.”
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 22.01 (1987): 17-32.
[17] De Franco, Carmine, and Peter Tankov. ”Portfolio insurance under a risk-
measure constraint.” Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 49.3 (2011): 361-
370.
101
A PROOF OF PART II. THEOREM 3.1
Part V.
Appendix
Appendix
A. Proof of Part II. Theorem 3.1
Let µ2 ≤ σ
2γx¯
. From the propositions 3.1 and 3.2 we know that only Ell, El and
Eff are possible. In order to have Ell it must be that the expected return is higher
than Li. This is exactly given for Li ≤ φ2(Pll). Since both agents must satisfy this
condition and since Pll < µ+σ, it is necessary and sufficient that L1, L2 ≤ φ2(Pll).
For Eff we get a necessary and sufficient condition L1, L2 ≥ φ1(Pff ) as both
agents must participate. This guarantees that the fully liable optimum dominates
the limitedly liable one. Since by construction Pff < µ, the result follows. Finally
for El it must be that for one agent the limited optimum dominates and for the
other agent the ’full’ optimum dominates. As by construction the price yields
both optima to dominate nonparticipation, the necessary and sufficient condition
is again given by comparing φ with Li. Hence, Li ≤ φ2(Pl) ≤ Lj, i, j ∈ {1, 2},i 6= j.
The logic for the cases µ2 ≥ σ
2γx¯
and µ2 < σ
γx¯
and µ2 ≥ σ
γx¯
is the same.
Recall that
Pll = − 1
2γx¯
+
√
1
4γ2x¯2
+
µ+ σ
γx¯
.
Plugging in that γx = σ
µ2
, it follows that
Pll = −
µ2
2σ
+
√
µ4
4σ2
+
µ3 + µ2σ
σ
= −µ
2
2σ
+
√
(
µ2 + 2µσ
2σ
)2 = µ.
Hence, from Pll = µ, it is φ1(Pll) = φ2(Pll), thus, φ1(Pll) = φ2(Pll) whenever
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γx = σ
µ2
.
In a similar fashion we have that for µ2 = σ
2γx¯
:
Pl = Pfl = µ.
Given this, it follows that φ1(Pfl) = φ2(Pl) for µ
2 = σ
2γx¯
.
For the behavior of the boundaries recall that φ1(P ) ≤ φ2(P ) and φ2(P ) ≥ 0.
Moreover, φ2(P ) is decreasing up to µ+ σ.
For case 1, this immediately yields 0 < φ2(Pll). With µ + σ ≥ Pll > Pl it follows
that φ2(Pll) < φ2(Pl). Finally, φ2(Pl) < φ2(µ) = φ1(µ) < φ1(Pff ), as Pff < µ < Pl
and φ1(P ) is decreasing until µ.
For case 2, 0 < φ2(Pll) holds for the same reasons. φ2(Pll) < φ1(Pfl) since φ2(Pll) <
φ2(µ) = φ1(µ) < φ1(Pfl). From the monotonicity of φ1(P ) until µ and Pff < Pfl <
µ it is φ1(Pfl) < φ1(Pff ).
For case 3, φ1(Pfl) < φ1(Pff )) for the same reasons as in case 2. φ1(Pll) < φ1(Pfl)
follows from φ1(Pll) < φ2(Pll) < φ2(µ) < φ1(Pfl).
B. Proof of Part II. Theorem 4.1
A necessary condition for Ef is that the price generated by the agent with the
higher worst case expectation, i.e. agent 2, makes agent 1 not participate. For this it
must be that Pf (µ2) ≥ µ1. This condition yields µ2 ≥ µ1 +2γx¯µ21. One can see that
for µ
2
= µ
1
this is not possible and therefore this type of equilibrium can only occur
with heterogeneous ambiguity. Similarly, for El we get µ2 ≥ µ1 +2γx¯µ21−σ. For Ell
it must be ensured that even for the agent who expects less return the price admits
a positive optimizer. Therefore, from µ1 ≥ Pll it follows that µ2 ≤ µ1+2γx¯(µ1+σ)2.
The cases Eff and Efl follow from the same method. Necessary and sufficient
additions are the requirements on the equity in the same manner as in chapter 3.
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